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Right to a Confidential Relationship
During the past year, federal and state prosecutors across the country
have issued subpoenas to newsmen and their employers in order to gain
access to confidential information obtained in the process of gathering
news about highly controversial topics.' This use of the subpoena power
has substantially increased the likelihood of a conflict between the ad-
ministration of justice and the public's First Amendment interest in a
free flow of information.2 Government officials have justified their
actions by pointing to the dangerous activities about which newsmen
1. Federal grand juries have subpoenaed the unedited files and unused pictures of
Time, Life, and Newsweek magazines relating to the Weathermen faction of Students for
a Democratic Society. Files relating to disturbances at the 1968 Democratic Convention
have been subpoenaed from four Chicago newspapers by a federal grand jury. The
Antitrust Division has issued a subpoena to Fortune magazine demanding all interview
notes, tape recordings, documents, and successive drafts of an article appearing in the
magazine concerning an alleged violator of the antitrust laws. A federal grand jury has
subpoenaed tapes and non-televised films of a program on the Black Panthers from the
Columbia Broadcasting System. Earl Ca'dwell, a San Francisco correspondent for the
New York Times has been summoned before a federal grand jury investigating activitiesof the Black Panther Party. The issuance of these subpoenas, which seems to represent a
divergence from previous Justice Department policy, are discussed in New York Timesarticles on Feb. 1, 197t at 24, ol. 1; Feb. 8, 1970 at 20, col. 1; Feb. 4, 1970 at 1, col. 1;
Feb. 5, 1970 at 1, col. 5; Feb. 6, 1970 at 1, col. 7.
This practice has also been used by state prosecutors. A Wisconsin grand jury has
subpoenaed a reporter to testify about a bombing on the University of Wisconsin cam-
pus. State v. Knops, No. 146 (Wis. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1971). A Massachusetts grand jury
has subpoenaed a reporter to testify about activities witnessed by him in the local Black
Panther headquarters during a time of civil disorder. In re Pappas, No. 14,690 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1971). In Kentucky, a prosecutor has sought disclosure of the identities
of those persons whom a reporter observed manufacturing hashish. Branzburg v. Pound,
89 US.L.W. 1088 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1970).
2. This conflict has been analyzed by previous commentators. See Comment, Constitu-
tional Protection For the Newsman's Work Product, 6 H~Av. Civ. RixGrrs-Civ. LIB. L. REv.
119 (1970); D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources
of Information, 6 IIRv. J. LEGIs. 307 (1969); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argu-
ment for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18 (1969); 82 HAkv. L.
REv. 1384 (1969); Beaver, The Newsman's Code, the Claim of Privilege and Everyman's
Right to Evidence, 47 Opa. L. REv. 248 (1968); Note, Privileged Communications-News
Media-A "Shield Statute" for Oregon, 46 ORE. L. REv. 99 (1966); 61 MICH. L. REv. 184
(1962); Carter, The Journalist, His Informant and Testimonial Privilege, 35 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1111 (1960); Note, Journalist's Testimonial Privilege, 9 CLrv.-MAL. L. REV. 311
(1960); 11 STAN. L. REv. 541 (1959); 8 BUFFALO L. REv. 294 (1959); Note, The Journalist
and His Confidential Informants-Should They Be Privileged from Compulsory Dis-
closure?, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 432 (1959); Note, The Journalist and His Confidential Source:
Should a Testimonial Privilege Be Allowed?, 35 NEa. L. Ra. 562 (1956); Note, The Right
of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REV.
61 (1950); Note, 45 YALE L.J. 857 (1935).
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may have knowledge.3 In response, the press has argued that informers,
fearing disclosure of their identities or their off-the-record communica-
tions, will be deterred from talking with newsmen arid that this loss of
information will critically limit news available for dissemination to
the public.4
In the past, courts have found that the interest in compulsory dis-
closure in the circumstances before them outweighed the potential im-
pairment of the news flow to the public; they accordingly have inter-
preted both the common law5 and the Constitution 6 to deny the press
the right to withhold information in the face of a compulsory disclosure
requirement. Within the last year, however, both federal and state
courts have found that, in some circumstances, a newsman's right to
protect his source is guaranteed by the First Amendment.7 Yet, that
right has not yet been affirmed by the Supreme Court nor is its nature
clear.8
This Note will argue that, subject to carefully delineated exceptions
applicable to criminal trials and certain libel actions, the First Amend-
ment should guarantee a broad right to keep communications and the
identities of informants confidential when news gatherers are summoned
3. See Statement of Attorney General Mitchell, New York Times, Feb. 6, 1970 at 40,
col. 4.
4. See, e.g., Frankel, Mitchell and Press Problems, New York Times, Feb. 6, 1970 at 40,
col. 4, discussing the threat to reporting posed by the subpoena.
5. For a discussion of cases denying the newsman a common law right of nondisclosure,
see Annot. 7 A.L.R. 3d 591, 592-96 (1966).
6. Garland v. Torre, 295 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); State v.
Knops, No. 146 (Wis. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1971); In re Pappas, No. 14,690 (Mass. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 29, 1971); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969); State v.
Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); In re Taylor, 412
Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963); In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, P.2d 472 (1961); Murphy v.
Colorado, unreported, cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961). Dicta in the Torre, Knops,
Adams, and Goodfader decisions indicate that a constitutional right of nondisclosure
might be found in other circumstances.
7. In re Caldwell, No. 26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970), petition for cert. filed sub nor.
U.S. v. Caldwell, 3905 U.S.L.W. 3273 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1970) (No. 1114). Air Transport Ass'n v.
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, Grim. Nos. 70-C-400, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)
(transcript of April 6, 1970 at 21, 38-39, 149-50); Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc.,
C.A. 52150 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (unreported hearing, Dec. 4, 1969, Tr. 165-67); People v. Dohrn,
Crim. No. 69-3808 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill. May 20, 1970); People v. Rios, No. 75129 (Super.
Ct. San Francisco Cty. 1970).
8. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari three times: State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244,
436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); Murphy v. Colorado, unreported, cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 843 (1961); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 358 U.S.
910 (1958). The government has recently filed a petition for certiorari in In re Caldwell, No.
26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970). petition for cert. filed sub nom. U.S. V. Caldwell, 3905 U.S.
L.W. 3273 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1970) (No. 1114). The Supreme Court has granted stays in two
recent cases concerning this issue, an indication that it might grant certiorari. In re
Pappas, No. 14,690 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1971), stay granted sub nom. Pappas v. Smith
by Mr. Justice Brennan (Feb. 4, 1971); Branzburg v. Pound, 39 U.S.L.W. 1088 (Ky. Ct.
App. Nov. 27, 1970), stay granted sub nor. Branzburg v. Hayes by Mr. Justice Stewart
(Jan. 26, 1971).
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before courts, grand juries, and legislative committees. An evaluation of
the conflicting positions will suggest that the First Amendment interest
of the newsman and his source in knowing with certainty when the con-
fidentiality of their relationship will be respected (and when it will not)
should be accorded substantially greater weight than the government's
claim for a roving commission to gain access to communications arising
from this relationship. This evaluation also provides guidance in decid-
ing the scope of protection, who may claim the right of nondisclosure,
what types of information the right protects, and when the right may be
invoked.
I. Current Approaches to the Right to a Protected Relationship
A. Competing Interests
The duty to testify at judicial proceedings is a venerable instrument
of justice which was recognized early in the development of English
law0 and has been clearly acknowledged by the Supreme Court.10 A
necessary function of the judicial process in both civil and criminal
litigation is to provide a forum where all facts relevant to the contro-
versy at issue may be presented. The theory of the adversary method of
conflict resolution demands that each party have the fullest opportunity
to acquire and present those facts which advance its interests.
Disclosure requirements are also important to grand jury proceedings;
they provide the means for investigating possible criminal conduct and
thereby protect society by facilitating the administration of the prosecu-
torial system." The testimony of newsmen, especially those supported
by the financial resources of the larger press institutions, is particularly
useful to a public prosecutor, since reporters' independent investigative
activities often overlap areas under official scrutiny. Because the posses-
sion of information by newsmen is easily recognized through published
work, prosecutors may turn to reporters as the most immediate sources
9. See 1 W. HoLoswoRTu, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 325-26 (7th ed. 1966); 5 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 192-93 (7th ed. 1966).
10. It is also beyond controversy that one of the duties which the citizen owes to his
government is to support the administration of justice by attending its courts and
giving his testimony whenever he is properly summoned.
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 488 (1982); for a history of the duty to testify, see
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1919).
11. The grand jury serves two important functions: "to examine into the commission of
crimes" and "to stand between the prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether
the charge was founded upon credible testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill
will." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906). Compulsory disclosure is important to both of
these functions.
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from which to obtain disclosure of material necessary for.indictments
and arrests.
A slightly different rationale explains the duty to testify at legislative
hearings. Article I of the Constitution invests Congress with "all legis-
lati ve powers" granted to the United States and with power "to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for carrying into execution
these powers and "all other powers" vested by the Constitution in the
United States or in any officer. The Supreme Court has held that the
power to secure needed information is an attribute of the power to
legislate. 12 The requirement of compulsory disclosure facilitates the
passage of effective laws by providing Congress with access to a full
range of relevant fact and opinion. The power to compel testimony is
also needed by state legislatures in order that they may secure infor-
mation necessary for informed lawmaking at that level of government. 3
From the press's perspective, however, the unrestrained use of sub-
poenas issued to newsmen impairs the flow of news to the public,
because compulsory testimony poses dilemmas for both news sources
and news gatherers which prevent establishment of the confidential
relationships necessary for obtaining information. The potential infor-
mant must speculate as to whether his identity or other off-the-record
aspects of his communications with a reporter will be subject to official
scrutiny through the subpoena process. The potential source is therefore
forced to choose either to give information, thus risking exposure to
official investigatory efforts, or to avoid the risk by remaining silent. The
reporter must speculate as to whether publication of certain material
will lead to a subpoena. If a subpoena is issued, the newsman must then
either disclose confidential information, which could impair his reputa-
tion and resourcefulness as a reporter, or receive a contempt citation
for his refusal to testify.
B. Attempted Resolutions
Current state and federal law resolves the conflict between the pub-
lic's interest in compelled disclosure and its interest in a free flow of
information in a variety of ways.
12. McGrain v. Daugherty, 278 U.S. 185, 175 (1927):
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of informa-
tion respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information-
which not infrequently is true-recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has taught that mere requests for such information are often unavailing,
and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete;
so that some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.
13. See Annot. 50 A.L.R. 21 (1927); Annot. 65 A.L.R. 1518 (1930). Administrative
agencies may also be granted subpoena power by statute in order to perform effectively
their functions. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7608(a)(2) (1964).
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No Privilege. The common law requires a reporter to testify concern-
ing information received in confidence and to disclose the identity of
informants, for it does not recognize that communication between
news gatherer and informant merits special protection.14
Statutory Privilege for Informant's Identity. Sixteen states have made
the legislative determination that protection of the identities of news-
men's informants from disclosure before judicial and legislative pro-
ceedings is necessary to maintain a flow of information to the public
and will not unduly hamper the judicial and legislative processes. 15 In
twelve of these states, the newsman may refuse to disclose the identity
of his informant regardless of the importance of disclosure to the
particular subject of inquiry.' 6 However, in half of these twelve states,
the communication with an informer must be published before a
reporter may claim the nondisclosure right regarding the source of infor-
mation.17 Only three of the state statutes protecting the identities of
news sources from disclosure also protect confidential communications
received from informants.18 The other state statutes require that con-
14. 8 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton ed. 1961). See 11 STAN. L. REV. 541
(1959); Comment, Compulsory Disclosure of a Newsman's Source: A Compromise Proposal,
54 Nw. U.L. REv. 243 (1959); Galleys, Further Consideration of a Privilege for Newsmen,
14 ALBANY L. REv. 16 (1950); Note, 45 YALE L.J. 357 (1935).
15. Ala. Code tit. 7, § 370 (1960); Alas. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 09.25.150, 160 (Supp. 1970);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1970); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-917 (1964); Cal. Evid.
Code § 1070 (1966); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.100 (1960);
La. Rev. Stat. tit. 45 §§ 1451-53 (Supp. 1970); Md. Code Ann. art. 35 § 2 (1965); Mich. C.L.
767.5a (1968); Mont. R. Code Ann. tit. 93 §§ 601-03 (1947); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:84A-21
(Supp. 1970); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 79-h (1970);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.12 (1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. titl. 28 § 80 (1958). For a
general discussion of these statutes, see D'Alemberte, supra note 2.
16. See statutory provisions, supra note 15, for Ala., Ariz., Cal., Ind., Ky., Md., Mich.,
Mont., N.J., N.Y., Ohio., and Pa. These statutes indicate a legislative determination that
any protection short of this broad right to maintain the secrecy of informants' identities
would significantly impair the newsgatherer-informer relationship because of the uncer-
tainties attending a qualified right.
Four states have a qualified newsman's right of nondisclosure. See statutory provisions,
supra note 15, for Alaska, Ark., La., and N.M. In Alaska, disclosure may be required if
the withholding of testimony would result in a "miscarriage of justice" or is "contrary to
the public interest." The Arkansas statute requires disclosure if it can be shown that an
article containing information from a confidential source was published "in bad faith,
with malice, and not in the interest of public welfare." The Louisiana statute requires
disclosure when "essential to the public interest." In New Mexico, disclosure is required
when "essential to prevent injustice."
17. See statutory provisions, supra note 15, for Ala., Ariz., Cal., Ky., Md., and N.J.
Publication is required in order to assure that the right of nondisclosure is only
granted when the public has had the opportunity to benefit from the informer's com-
munication.
18. See statutory provisions, supra note 15, for Mich., N.Y., and Pa. The Michigan sta-
tute protects from disclosure all "communications" between reporters and informants. The
New York statute provides for nondisclosure of "any news or the source of any such
news." This statute was passed in May, 1970, subsequent to the issuance of a number of
Justice Department subpoenas to newsmen requiring diclosure of information commu-
nicated in confidence. See p. 317 and note I supra. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has construed the word "source" in the Pennsylvania statute to include confidential in-
formation, as well as the identities of sources. In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 40, 193 A.2d 181,
184-85 (1963). o
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fidential communications be disclosed even though the identity of the
source may be protected.
A number of federal statutes shielding the newsman from compulsory
disclosure have been proposed in an effort to achieve uniform standards
of protection for news gathering.19 In the past, these proposals have
been limited to protecting the identities of news informants from dis-
closure.20 However, in 1970, legislation was proposed which protects
both the identities of informants and confidential communications
received from them, unless disclosure is required in the interests of
national security.21
Reasonable Likelihood Test. One state court has suggested that com-
pulsory revelation of informants or confidential information might
raise First Amendment problems, but it proceeded to hold that dis-
closure of a newsman's information and sources is constitutional when
there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the desired information will be
relevant to the judicial subject of inquiry.22 This test aims to eliminate
groundless "fishing expeditions" and to restrict disclosure to situations in
which there is reason to believe the disclosed information will aid
the administration of justice.23
Heart of the Matter Test. The Second Circuit's opinion in Garland
19. See, e.g., S. 1851, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 8519, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1968); S. 965, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 855, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959). For an
analysis of proposed Congressional legislation, see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDI-
CIARY, 89TH CONc., 2D SEss., THE NEwsmAN's PRIVILEGE (Comm. Print 1966).
20. A typical proposal reads:
A witness who is employed by a newspaper, news service, newspaper syndicate,
periodical, or radio or television station or network, as a writer, reporter, corre-
spondent, or commentator or in any other capacity directly involved in the gathering
or presentation of news, shall not be required in any court of the United States to
disclose the source of any information obtained in such capacity unless in the opinion
of the court such disclosure is necessary in the interests of national security.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 19, at 1.
21. S. 3552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 16328, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R.
16704, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
22. In a case before the Hawaiian Supreme Court, In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367
P.2d 472 (1961), a plaintiff was suing for reinstatement on the Civil Service Commission,
claiming that her dismissal was the result of prior conspiracy among the Commission
members. She sought disclosure of the source from whom a reporter had received advance
warning of her dismissal. The court recognized that disclosure would create some deter-
rent effect but held that disclosure could be constitutionally allowed because the reporter's
source might have knowledge as to the cause of her dismissal and aid her claim. It rea-
soned:
There, of course, can be no assurance that if the plaintiff is permitted to pursue her
inquiry, she will obtain from deponent's answers the identity of anyone who can
substantiate the basic point of her alleged case .... [We can only say that it is our
best judgment that the inquiry desired to be made by the plaintiff in this case could
be considered likely enough to lead to discovery of sufficiently important admissible
evidence to warrant the trial court's permitting her to pursue it ....
Id. at 38, 567 P.2d at 484-85.
23. Presumably this standard, determined in a trial context, could also apply to grandjury and legislative investigations; disclosure could be required if there were reason to
believe that the desired information would aid the investigation.
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v. Torre can be read to require that the constitutionality of compul-
sory disclosure of a newsman's confidential sources be determined
by whether the information sought by subpoena goes "to the heart of
the . .. claim."24 In this case, Judy Garland had sued the Columbia
Broadcasting System for libel because of an allegedly defamatory com-
ment published in a newspaper column, but attributed to an unnamed
C.B.S. executive. The identity of the author of the comment was crucial
to her claim, for only if he were proven to be a C.B.S. executive would
she have grounds for action against the broadcasting network. The
court reasoned that because the action would be defeated if the inform-
er's identity were not revealed, "the paramount public interest in the
fair administration of justice" outweighed the potential injury to the
free flow of news.25 It indicated that in other situations, as "where the
identity of the news source is of doubtful relevance or materiality," the
source might not be constitutionally compelled to testify.26 This is
perhaps a stricter test than the demand for "reasonable likelihood."
The Torre rationale suggests that disclosure should not be compelled
unless the information possessed by the reporter appears important to
the resolution of the judicial controversy.
A variant of the "heart of the matter" test has been proposed by
recent Justice Department guidelines for the issuance of federal investi-
gatory subpoenas.27 As with the "heart of the matter" test, the theory of
this proposal is that testimony should not be compelled before govern-
mental bodies unless the desired information appears necessary to the
inquiry. These guidelines state that "[t]here should be sufficient reason
to believe that the information sought is essential to a successful investi-
gation"; they explicitly recognize that "[t]he subpoena should not be
used to obtain peripheral, nonessential or speculative information.128
The Attorney General's permission is required for issuance of a sub-
poena to a reporter, and the guidelines further recommend that, before
issuance of such a subpoena, "reasonable" attempts should be made
24. 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court interpreted the Torre decision in this manner. State v. Knops, No. 146
(Wis. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1971).
25. Id. at 549.
26. Id. at 549-50.
27. Address by Attorney General John N. Mitchell, A.B.A. House of Delegates, Aug. 10,
1970, in 7 Cum. L. REP. 2461 (Sept. 2, 1970). Previously there were no express guidelines,
although it was Justice Department policy to negotiate with the publisher prior to the
issuance of a subpoena. See Statement of Attorney General Mitchell, New York Times, Feb.
6, 1970 at 40, col. 4.
28. Address by Attorney General John N. Mitchell, supra note 27.
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to obtain the desired information from nonpress sources or to persuade
the reporter to convey voluntarily the desired material 9
Miscarriage of Justice. A constitutional test requiring disclosure by a
newsman only when a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result
appears to be a somewhat stricter standard than a determination
whether the information goes "to the heart of the matter." An Illinois
court recently adopted this test in People v. Dohrn. °0 The court held
that the Illinois subpoena statutes violated the First Amendment rights
of newsmen by requiring them to appear before judicial bodies regard-
less of the importance of the testimony desired from them. The court
reasoned that because of the "inherently" inhibiting effect of subpoenas
on reporters, the party desiring such a subpoena must show substantial
cause for compelling the reporter's testimony. It then quashed sub-
poenas which had been served on newsmen by the defendants in a
criminal suit and held that no such orders may be issued without a
preliminary hearing at which the party desiring to compel the reporter's
testimony must prove: (I) there is probable cause to believe that the
reporter has information relevant to the subject of investigation; (2)
the subpoena is the only method by which the evidence may be ob-
tained; and (3) a "miscarriage of justice" would result if the information
sought were not provided. 1
Compelling Need. The Ninth Circuit recently adopted a somewhat
similar constitutional test as a prerequisite for compelling a journalist
to appear before a grand jury.82 The district court had held that New
York Times reporter Earl Caldwell must appear before the grand jury
investigating the Black Panther Party, but it had granted him a pro-
tective order stating that he was not required to testify about matters
transmitted to him in confidence until such time as a "compelling and
overriding national interest which cannot be alternatively served has
been established to the satisfaction of the court.' 3 3 The court of
29. Id. These guidelines would be applicable for the issuance of subpoenas by all Justice
Department officials whether in a trial or grand jury context. However, neither Congress,
state legislatures, state prosecutors, nor individual litigants would be bound by the guide-
lines.
30. People v. Dohrn, Crim. No. 69-8808 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill. May 20, 1970).
81. Id. This standard entails judicial enforcement of an "alternative means" test sug-
gested by the Justice Department guidelines; disclosure may be required only when the
confidential information appears necessary to a non-frivolous claim or investigation and
the desired information cannot be obtained in an alternative fashion. It is applicable to
both the government and private parties, and presumably applies in both a judicial and
legislative setting; however, it is difficult to determine how the "alternative means" test
will function in a criminal trial in those circumstances in which there is need for cu-
mulative evidence.
82. In re Caldwell, No. 26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970).
83. Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 858, 860 (N.D. Cal., 1970).
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appeals agreed with the district court that "compelled disclosure of in-
formation received by a journalist within the scope of such confidential
relationships jeopardizes those relationships and thereby impairs the
journalist's ability to gather, analyze, and publish the news."3 4 However,
becausd of the potential deterrence created by Caldwell's mere appear-
ance before a secret investigatory body, the court of appeals held that
the First Amendment provided Caldwell with a right not to appear
before a grand jury until the state had demonstrated a "compelling
need" for his testimony.3 5 While the court did not set guidelines as to
what would constitute such a showing, it referred to those standards
formulated in People v. Dohrn as possible criteria for a state showing
of "compelling need."36 The Ninth Circuit did not indicate whether
"compelling need" had a meaning different from the phrase, a "com-
pelling and overriding national interest," although the concurring
opinion suggested that no distinction was intended.3 7
II. First Amendment Protection for the Reporter-Informant Relation-
ship
The newsman's right to protect his sources and their communications
flows from the freedom of the press clause of the First Amendment.38
However, those cases39 which have found constitutional protection for
the newsman-informer relationship have not, in construing the free
34. In re Caldwell, No. 26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970) (quoting district court opinion).
35. The Ninth Circuit reasoned:
[We find guidance in the Supreme Court decisions regarding conflicts between First
Amendment interests and legislative investigatory needs; the Court has required the
sacrifice of First Amendment freedoms only where a compelling need for the partic-
ular testimony in question is demonstrated.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
36. See p. 324 supra.
37. Judge Jameson, concurring, stated:
In my opinion the order of the district court could properly be affirmed, and this
would accord with the customary procedure of requiring a witness to seek a protective
order after appearing before the grand jury. I have concluded however, that Judge
Merrill's opinion properly holds that the same result may be achieved by requiring
the Government to demonstrate the compelling need for the witness's presence prior
to the issuance of a subpoena and in this manner avoid any unnecessary impinge-
ment of First Amendment rights.
In re Caldwell, No. 26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970) (concurring opinion).
38. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... " The First Amendment is not only applicable
to legislative action, but also to action by the federal executive and judiciary, including
the issuance of subpoenas in connection with federal investigations and proceedings. See,
e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1957). The First Amendment applies
to state government by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
854 U.S. 284 (1957).
89. See note 7 supra.
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press clause, enunciated a coherent set of principles which justify the
right of nondisclosure. Nor have they provided much guidance for fu-
ture decisions, since they are usually based on an ad hoc balance of
interests. For example, in the recent Caldwell case, the court of appeals
held that a reporter did not have to appear before a grand jury be-
cause the political group he covered was extremely sensitive to the
possibility of disclosure of certain information the reporter had ob-
tained.40 The court recognized that, because of the potential deterrence
of informers in that particular situation and because the government
had not shown a "compelling need" for his testimony, the First Amend-
ment provided the reporter with a right of nondisclosure. However,
uncertainty still surrounds the newsman-informer relationship, since
the court offered no guidelines to measure the requisite potential deter-
rence or the quantum of need to be demonstrated by the government.
In light of the divergent approaches adopted by lower courts and the
stunted rationales of those decisions which have given constitutional
protection to the informer-reporter relationship, a coherent First
Amendment argument for the constitutional right to a confidential
relationship must be developed before the proper reconciliation of the
competing interests can be determined.
A. "Freedom of the Press" Implies the Right to Gather News
Democratic society is premised on the idea of individual autonomy
and requires that citizens make informed decisions of a political, social,
and economic nature. This conception of personal development and
participation in societal processes, which is a core tenet of democratic
theory, is based, in turn, on a presumption that the fullest range of in-
formation should be available to individuals so that they will be ade-
40. The court reasoned:
Finally we wish to emphasize what must already be clear: the rule of this case is a
narrow one. It is not every news source that is as sensitive as the Black Panther Party
has been shown to be respecting the performance of the "establishment" press or the
extent to which that performance is open to view. It is not every reporter who so
uniquely enjoys the trust and confidence of his sensitive news source.
In re Caldwell, No. 26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970). Uncertainty as to the use of this test
in other newsman-informer relationships is exemplified by a comparison of recent deci-
sions by the supreme courts of Massachusetts and Wisconsin. The Massachusetts court
rejected the test altogether, arguing that "there exists no constitutional newsman's
privilege, either qualified or absolute, to refuse to appear and testify before a court or
grand jury." In re Pappas, No. 14,690 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1971). The Wisconsin
court, acknowledging the test, held that a newsman could be required to disclose before
a grand jury the identities of those who had allegedly bombed a building because the
"administration of criminal justice itself is a sufficient substantial interest of the state."
This interpretation of the "compelling need" test suggests that disclosure could always
be compelled during an investigation into possible criminal conduct. State v. Knops, No.
146 (Wis. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1971).
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quately equipped to make both personal and political decisions.41 Such
access to opinion and fact may only be provided if there is a flow of
information to the public, unconstrained (insofar as possible) by either
public or private forces. A free press plays a crucial role in preserving
this infoi-mation flow, for in a large and complex society where face-to-
face communication is often impossible on a meaningful scale, informa-
tion must usually be disseminated through the press.42 In giving
meaning to the First Amendment's mandate for a free press, the
Supreme Court has, therefore, defined freedom to print as a right basic
to the existence of a democratic society.43
The Court has also delineated a set of corollary rights to "freedom to
print" which must be protected in order to ensure the continued vitality
of the information flow to the public. A basic freedom is the right to
publish without prior governmental approval.44 The Court has recog-
nized, however, that government action less drastic than prior censor-
ship may curtail the dissemination of news to the public. In Grosjean
v. American Press Co., the Court found it necessary to recognize ex-
plicitly a right of circulation in order to ensure the preservation of an
"untrammeled press as a vital source of public information." 45 Other
Supreme Court decisions have recognized the right to distribute litera-
ture freely46 and the right to receive printed matter without state re-
strictions which might impair the free flow of information.47
41. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMEND.MENT 3-15 (196.3).
Emerson states four reasons for maintaining a system of free expression: (I) to assure In-
dividual self-fulfillment; (2) to attain the truth; (3) to secure the participation of the
members of society in social decision-making; and (4) to maintain a balance between
stability and change in society. Id. at 3. See generally A. MEIKFLJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovEmNMENT (1948).
42. The First Amendment freedom of the press provision applies to radio and television
broadcasting as well as to publications. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C. 395
U.S. 367 (1969).
43. See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254, 270 (1964).
44. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
45. 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). A special license tax applicable only to newspapers with
circulation in excess of 20,000 copies per week was held unconstitutional as a restraint
upon both publication and circulation. The Court recognized that the tax would
deter circulation in excess of 20.000 and therefore limit the flow of news to the public.
46. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939).
For example, in Martin v. City of Struthers, supra, the Court held unconstitutional an
ordinance which forbade door-to-door distribution of handbills because those accustomed
to Circulating material in this manner would be restrained in their activities, and, as a
consequence, the public would be the recipient of less information. The ordinance was
passed for substantial reasons, viz. prevention of crime and protection of privacy in an
industrial community where many worked night shifts. However, the Court determined
that the reasons advanced to support the statute were insufficient to justify such a limita-
tion on the means of distribution.
47. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). The case involved a challenge
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The right to-gather news is as basic to a free press as the right to
distribute and receive printed materials, because without freedom to
gather information the right to print would be severely diminished
in value. The general principle that news must not be unnecessarily
cut off at its source is fundamental to the concept of a free flow of in-
formation to the public. The framers of the Bill of Rights recognized
that the right to gather news was implicit in the First Amendment.
Madison wrote:
A popular government without popular information or the means
of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy or perhaps
both.48
Modern commentators have also emphasized the fundamental impor-
tance of the news gathering function of the press:
If the public opinion which directs conduct of governmental affairs
is to have any validity and if the people are to be capable of real
self-rule, access to all relevant facts upon which rational judg-
ments may be based must be provided.4 9
The right to gather material for publication has never been explicitly
recognized by the Supreme Court. However, the Court, in recognizing
specific exceptions to a right of access in the interests of national se-
curity, has implicitly acknowledged the existence of a general right to
gather information.50 The existence of some right to gather news (what-
to legislation which required the Postmaster General to detain unsealed foreign mailings
of "communist political propaganda" and deliver only upon the addressee's request. The
statute was held to violate the addressee's First Amendment right to receive information
because it imposed upon him an affirmative obligation of requesting delivery, and he
might be deterred from performing the necessary steps in order to receive the information.
Mr. Justice Brennan concurring, reasoned that the First Amendment protected dissemina-
tion of ideas and that "such dissemination can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing
addressees are not free to receive and consider them." 881 US. at 308.
48. 6 WRrrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 398 (Hunt ed. 1906).
49. Note, Access to Official Inforpation: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L.J.
209, 211 (1952).
50. See Zemel v. Rusk, 881 U.S. 1 (1965). The Supreme Court held that the Secretary
of State's denial of a passport for travel to Cuba did not violate a citizen's First Amendment
right to acquire information concerning that country. The Court recognized that the
Secretary's refusal to validate passports for Cuba rendered less than wholly free the flow
of information concerning that country; however, it reasoned that the Secretary's refusal
was a restraint of action, and that under certain circumstances actions were subject to
regulation. Implicitly recognizing some right to gather information, the Court
concluded that the "right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained
right to gather information," and that "the weightiest considerations of national security"
necessitated this particular restraint. Id. at 17, 16 (emphasis added).
See also Associated Press v. United States, 326 US. 1 (1945). In this case, certain by-laws
of the Associated Press were held to be in violation of the Sherman Act because they
prevented non-member newspapers from purchasing news from the Associated Press- or
its publisher members and thus curtailed publication of competitive newspapers. The
Court noted, however, that the First Amendment provided a substantial argument in
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ever its exact dimensions) is thus derived both from the central position
a free press occupies in democratic theory and from its relation to other
rights established by the existing cases interpreting the freedom of the
press dause.51
B. The Right to Gather News Implies the Right to Protect News
Sources
The right to confidential informer-reporter relationships follows
logically from the right to gather news when four factual assumptions
are accepted: (1) newsmen require informants to gather news; (2) con-
fidentiality (the promise that names and certain aspects of communica-
tions will be kept off-the-record) is essential to the establishment of a
relationship with many informers; (3) the use of an unbridled subpoena
power will deter potential sources from divulging information; and
(4) the use of an unbridled subpoena power will deter reporters from
gathering or publishing information which might lead to a demand for
complete compulsory disclosure. If these factual assumptions are cor-
rect, the press will be less effective in uncovering criminal activity,
corruption, government mismanagement, and other matters of public
interest unless a right to protect the confidentiality of news sources is
created. Much discussion will be stifled concerning socially controversial
activities, such as illegal abortion and drug usage, for individuals will
avoid the possibility of public identificaton with illegal conduct.52 Some
persons will be reluctant to voice their opinions without assurances of
anonymity for fear of harassment and reprisal.5 3
support of the application of the antitrust laws because the by-laws denied non-member
newspapers access to news:
That amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public, and that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that
the government itself shall not impede the flow of ideas does not afford non-govern-
mental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally
guaranteed freedom.
rd. at 20.
51. The right to gather information raises a number of complex issues such as an
individual's right to travel, discussed in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), and an in-
dividual's right of access to government information. However, discussion in this Note
is limited to the right to confidential informer-reporter relationships as derived from
the right to gather information.
52. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan. 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U1.S. 905
(1968), which required disclosure of several informants who, under an express promise that
their identities would not be revealed, had provided information to a reporter relating to
the use of marijuana on a university campus.
53. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of guarantees of anonymity to
assure free expression. In Talley v. California, a statute prohibiting distribution of anon-
ymous handbills was held void on its face because "identification and fear of reprisal
might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance." 362 U.S. 60,
65 (1960).
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It is obvious that the first assumption is valid. However, courts that
have denied the constitutional right to confidential informer-reporter
relationships have often not accepted the validity of either the second,
third, or fourth assumptions from which the right is logically derived.5
4
Yet, available data suggests that those who deny any validity to these
three assumptions are wrong to do so.
Surveys of the press indicate that a substantial number of newspaper
stories are based on information which could only be secured through
confidential informer-reporter relationships. 55 Erwin D. Canham, edi-
tor-in-chief of the Christian Science Monitor, estimates that from 3%
to 50% of that newspaper's major stories involve confidential sources,
and the Wall Street Journal states that 15% of its articles are based on
information from confidential informants.56 The managing editor of
the San Francisco Chronicle writes that "an absolutely staggering num-
ber of stories, political and non-political, arise from information re-
ceived in confidence." 57 "Systematic" empirical evidence has not been
developed, in part because reporters and editors do not keep records
of the confidential nature of sources and therefore must make educated
guesses as to the incidence of confidentiality. But it is still clear from
available data that some leading newsmen regard confidentiality as
essential for development of many news stories.
The issuance of subpoenas to news gatherers also appears to silence
potential informants who fear that their identity or their off-the-record
communications may have to be revealed by the newsman. Even some
courts that have denied the constitutional right to a confidential rela-
tionship have taken judicial notice that compulsory disclosure of in-
formation will deter informers and limit sources available to newsmen.
58
Recognizing that a broad guarantee of confidentiality is essential to the
54. See note 6 supra. In the Massachusetts case, In re Pappas, No. 14,690 (Mass. Sup.
Ct. Jan. 29, 1971), the court stated: "Any effect on the free dissemination of news is
indirect, theoretical, and uncertain, and relates at most to the future gathering of news."
55. For the most extensive survey to date, see the Appendix to Guest & Stanzler, supra
note 2, at 57-61. In Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970), eighteen
affidavits by such prominent newsmen as Walter Cronkite and Eric Sevareid were sub-
mitted with the Caldwell and amicus briefs stressing the importance of informer-reporter
relationships in the gathering of news and the necessity of guaranteeing confidentiality for
the maintenance of these relationships. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on these
affidavits:
The fact that subpoenas would have a "chilling effect" on First Amendment freedoms
was impressively asserted in affidavits of newsmen of recognized stature, to a con-
siderable extent based upon recited experience.
In re Caldwell, No. 26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970).
56. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 2, at 43-44, 61.
57. Id. at 60.
58. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 858 U.S. 910 (1958);
In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 41, 193 A.2d 181, 185 (1968).
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maintenance of informer-reporter relationships, the American Newspa-
per Guild has adopted the following rule as part of the newsman's code of
ethics:
Newspaper men shall refuse to reveal confidence or disclose
sources of confidential information in court or before other judi-
cial or investigative bodies.50
Although again no "systematic" empirical evidence of a deterrent ef-
fect is available, the inhibiting effect of subpoenas to newsmen on the
willingness of informants to talk to newsmen has been demonstrated
by the reaction of militant groups to the recent increase in subpoenas
issued by federal grand juries. The Oakland Black Caucus, an organiza-
tion representing major black groups in the Oakland area, refused to
co-operate with the American Broadcasting Company in the filming of
a documentary on the Black Panthers when A.B.C. admitted it was un-
able to provide an assurance that its newsmen would remain silent in
the face of possible government subpoenas.60 In this and other cases,"'
fear generated by the issuance of a subpoena to New York Times re-
porter Earl Caldwell was expressly stated as the reason for the infor-
mants' unwillingness to co-operate with newsmen. The impediment to
news gathering caused by a reporter's testimony under subpoena before
a legislative committee has also been recently demonstrated. When a
New York Times reporter was required to testify before the House
Committee on Internal Security investigating militant activities, mili-
tant groups thereafter refused to talk with either him or other Times
reporters, asserting that those newsmen could not be trusted with con-
fidential information. 62
The silencing effect caused by the increase in government subpoenas
has not been confined to militant groups. A Newsweek reporter's affi-
davit submitted in the Caldwell trial asserts:
59. G. BiRD and F. MERviN, THE NEWSPAPER AND SocIETY 567 (1942).
60. Affidavits of Gilbert E. Noble and Timothy C. Knight accompanying Petitioner's
Brief, Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
61. A Los Angeles Newsweek correspondent who had previously maintained good
relations with the Panthers was refused an interview until Newsweek agreed to contest
judicially any subpoenas the correspondent received, but by the time this agreement was
secured, the subject of the interview had left Los Angeles. Affidavit of Nicholas C.
Proffitt, accompanying Brief for Newsweek as Amicus Curiae, Application of Caldwell, 311
F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970). In New York, a New York Times reporter found previous
news sources unwilling to discuss Black Panther activities. Affidavit of David Burnham,
accompanying Petitioner's Brief, Application of Caldwell, supra. In Massachusetts, a
former source of information on black militant groups was highly reluctant to cooperate
with a Newsweek Bureau Chief. Affidavit of Frank Morgan, accompanying Brief for
Newsweek as Amicus Curiae, Application of Caldwell, supra.
62. Affidavits of Anthony Ripley, John Kifner, Thomas A. Johnson, Earl Caldwell, &
Gerald Fraser, accompanying Petitioner's Brief, Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358
(N.D. Cal. 1970).
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Particularly disturbing to me has been a marked increase recently,
in the reticence of my confidential sources in government itself.
These sources, some of whom have in the past been instrumental
in exposing instances of governmental abuse or corruption, now
tell me that, because of the increasingly widespread use of sub-
poenas to obtain names and other confidential information from
reporters, they are fearful of reprisals and loss of jobs if they are
identified by their superiors as sources of information for news-
men.63
It also appears likely that some reporters will be deterred from seek-
ing and publishing information that could lead to a subpoena which
would force them to disclose confidential information or to receive a
contempt citation. Again, it is difficult to reach any precise conclusions
as to the extent of this deterrence, but the acceptance of contempt cita-
tions by newsmen in the past indicates an unwillingness to place them-
selves in a position of losing their reputation through disclosure of
information intended to be kept confidential.6 4 It is not unreasonable
to assume that some reporters, especially those who cannot count on
the support of their editors or publishers or who cannot otherwise
command resources for legal defense, will be reluctant to print stories
likely to lead to subpoenas and possible contempt citations.05
Nonetheless, the validity of the factual assumptions has not been
established "conclusively," in part because of the inherent ambiguity,
in this context, of the concept of "conclusiveness," a word which
necessarily has reference to values as well as to facts. For example, what
63. Affidavit of Jon Lowell, accompanying Brief for Newsweek as Amicus Curiae,
Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See also affidavits of Walter
Cronkite and Mike Wallace, accompanying Brief for C.B.S. as Amicus Curiae, Application
of Caldwell, supra, for examples of the importance of confidential informers in gathering
news concerning government activities. In his affidavit, Cronkite cites five recent examples
of important stories he could have secured only through confidential informants:
A member of the staff of a United States Senator advised me, far in advance of the
announcement, that his employer did not plan to run for re-election. Another person
in a similar position tipped me to his employer's intention to seek higher office. An
officer high in Pentagon circles recently offered evidence of pressure high in the
military command structure to get the President to cut back on his Viet Nam with-
drawal commitments. A bartender told me of fraud in restaurant inspection in New
York City. A scientist asserted that the Atomic Energy Commission's safety standards
for atomic energy installations were not adequate. None of these persons would have
volunteered this information if they thought they would be exposed as the source
of this information.
64. See notes 5 and 6 supra. There has not been extensive research in this area, how-
ever, to determine the extent that reporters are deterred by the absence of a broad right
of confidentiality.
65. The threat of a deterrence of reporters was recognized in the Caldwell case:
[I]t is not unreasonable to expect journalists everywhere to temper their reporting so
as to reduce the probability that they will be required to submit to interrogation.
The First Amendment guards against governmental action that induces self-censor-
ship.
In re Caldwell, No. 26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970).
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would it mean to show "conclusively" that Assumption #2-confi-
dentiality is essential to the establishment of many reporter-informer
relationships-was valid for "constitutional purposes"? First, it would
require a difficult factual inquiry to determine what percentage of all
reporter-informer relationships are confidential. But, even assuming it
were possible to find a methodologically satisfying answer to that ques-
tion, when would the finding be "conclusive enough" to require that
the right to a confidential relationship be given constitutional protec-
tion: when 10% are confidential, 50%, "some," "many"? Obviously, the
second question can only be answered with reference to value choices.
Similarly, determining the validity for constitutional purposes of
Assumption #3 or #4-the use of an unbridled subpoena power will
deter potential sources from divulging information or reporters from
gathering and printing certain kinds of information-requires a pre-
diction about the occurrence of factual sequences in the future. If X
occurs, Y or Z will result N per cent of the time. Again, even if one
could produce a proposition in that form that was defensible in
methodological terms (and there is substantial reason to doubt that such
an achievement is possible),"6 the value question of when N per cent
was sufficiently great to require constitutional protection for the right
would still be open. If such a proposition cannot be produced, then
one's assessment of the assumption-one's presumption about its
validity and the degree of "incidence" deemed important-would even
more starkly depend upon value preferences.
The reason for determining the validity of the four assumptions iso-
lated above is to help resolve two issues: first, the one posed in this
subsection-should some right to a confidential relationship exist?; sec-
ond, the one posed in the next two subsections-how far should that
right extend (how important is it compared to other interests)? But
the question of factual validity regarding the existence of confidential
relationships (Assumption #2) and the scope and incidence of deterrent
effects that result from use of the subpoena power (Assumptions #3 and
#4) must be inevitably linked with the value question of the importance
of the First Amendment interests. Clearly, given the "inconclusive"
state of available facts and the likelihood that they will in important
respects remain "inconclusive," 67 resolution of the two issues must rest
66. Establishing the empirical basis for the deterrence assumption is complicated by
determining what constitutes "unbridled subpoena power," when such power has existed,
and when informants have been aware of its existence.
67. An empirical study is presently being conducted by the Field Foundation under
the direction of Vince Blasi of the University of Michigan Law School, and Richard
Baker and W. Phillips Davison of the Columbia School of Journalism. While additional
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on articulated value choices-on a presumption for or against the First
Amendment interests in this setting.
This Note proposes that the facts presently known rebut the charge of
invalidity previously attached to the four assumptions by some courts
and warrant the establishment of some right to a confidential reporter-
informer relationship. This conclusion-which is the fulcrum of the
subsequent argument-rests on two beliefs.
First, the demonstration of some factual validity of the four assump-
tions and common sense are sufficient grounds for presuming that these
assumptions will have some validity in the future. For example, it
seems clear that sources within government, who are willing to divulge
information to the press about alleged government misfeasance, will
dry up if they have reason to believe their names can be compelled.
Second, a relationship, (a) whose protection is consistent with First
Amendment theory68 and (b) that has some basis in fact, should be given
constitutional protection if "unnecessary" deterrent effects can be
shown. The word "unnecessary" does not have reference to a finely
calibrated evaluation of empirically validated behavior in which the
"benefits" of the right are quantified and weighed against its "costs." ' 0
As will be discussed in the next subsections, both these beliefs draw
strength from the Supreme Court's sensitivity to deterrent effects on
First Amendment freedoms. This sensitivity is based clearly on value
preferences arising out of common sense predictions, since it is extremely
difficult for the Court to "prove" the existence of those effects or to
demonstrate their "rate of incidence" with any precision.
data will provide helpful information concerning confidential informer-reporter relation-
ships and the deterrent effects caused by the issuance of subpoenas to reporters, such
data can by no means be conclusive and is not necessary for a judicial decision that the
informer-reporter relationship should receive constitutional protection. Reporters ques-
tioned in a survey cannot determine the number of potential informants who have re-
frained from contacting newsmen because of the absence of a right of nondisclosure,
and it is doubtful whether they can determine the extent to which their informants
refrain from fully disclosing information to them because of the absence of a nondisclosure
right. If a survey attempts to question informants, it will be extremely difficult to obtain
a random sample of confidential informants willing to respond to such an inquiry. Fur-
thermore, it will be difficult to build the requisite objectivity into a survey where all
persons questioned have a vested interest in the results of the study. Therefore, courts
must rely on logical reasoning, present knowledge of the newsman-informer relation-
ship, and presumptions based on First Amendment values, to decide that a constitutional
right to confidential informer-reporter relationships is necessary to the maintenance of
a free flow of information.
68. See pp. 326-29 supra.
69. At this point, the Note assumes some "unnecessary" effects exist. An extended
discussion of this value judgment occurs at pp. 345-60 infra.
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C. The Right to Protect News Sources Must Be Broad and Subject
Only to Clear Exceptions
Establishing the necessity for judicial recognition of some First
Amendment right to protect informer-reporter relationships, however,
does not define its precise nature or scope. Two general principles de-
rived from other First Amendment cases will provide an orientation to
help further delineate the dimensions of this right: (1) permissible
governmental regulation of First Amendment conduct may not be
vague in scope or application; and (2) First Amendment rights are
accorded special protections and may be restricted only because of a
compelling government interest. Although the First Amendment speaks
in terms of "law," the protections of the Amendment are available not
only against legislation but against government action in other forms.,0
In areas where the Supreme Court has recognized that the govern-
ment may regulate First Amendment conduct, the Court has insisted
upon precision and specificity of the prohibitions so that parties will
not unnecessarily forego the exercise of First Amendment rights3 1 It is
well settled that a statute which is so indefinite in its language or is in-
terpreted to permit the punishment of incidents which are within the
protection of the First Amendment is void on its face.72 Similarly,
stricter standards of permissible vagueness are applied to governmental
action which has a potentially inhibiting effect on speech or the press
than are applied to governmental regulation of economic activity: 73 "A
man may the less be required to act at his peril here because the free
dissemination of ideas will be the loser."74 Administrative or executive
action would seem logically subject to similar prohibitions regard-
ing overbreadth, vagueness, and abuse of discretion if exercise of this
action (e.g., issuance of subpoenas) impinges upon First Amendment
rights.
70. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965). Standards of permissible statutory
vagueness are particularly high when a state empowers an administrative or executive
agency to take action which may infringe First Amendment rights. Cf. United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275-76 (.967) (Brennan, J., concurring):
[T]he numerous deficiendes connected with vague legislative directives .• . are far
more serious when ... the exercise of fundamental rights [is] at stake.
* . . Formulation of policy is a legislature's primary responsibility, entrusted to it
by the electorate, and to the extent Congress delegates authority under indefinite
standards, this policy-making function is passed on to other agencies, often not
answerable or responsive in the same degree ....
71. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAnv. L.
REv. 844 (1970); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808
(1969).
72. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1 ). See generally, Note, The
Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
73. Winter v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 517.18 (1948).
74. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
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The Supreme Court has frequently emphasized the need for certainty
in the exercise of First Amendment rights, even though precision in-
creases the likelihood that libelous and obscene materials (which the
state has a legitimate interest in suppressing) will be published and
distributed.7 5 This certainty is necessary to effectuate the free press
guarantee of the First Amendment because, without certainty, parties
responsible for the dissemination of information to the public will be
unable to predict when the state can suppress their activities. Thus,
there is a substantial possibility that they will unduly censor their pub-
lications to avoid punishment. The Court has determined that the
mere prospect of self-censorship of activity protected by the First
Amendment is sufficient to hold such statutes unconstitutional on the
ground of vagueness even though the exact extent of self-censorship is
empirically uncertain. 6
The deterrent effect of an unbridled subpoena power may be
analogized to the inhibiting effect of vague and overbroad statutes af-
fecting First Amendment freedoms.7 7 Unless reporters and informers can
predict with some certainty the likelihood that newsmen will be re-
quired to disclose names or information obtained in confidential rela-
tionships, there is a substantial possibility that many reporters and in-
formers will be reluctant to engage in such relationships. As a result
of this deterrence, the flow of information to the public will be
diminished regardless of whether disclosure could have actually been
compelled. Thus, to prevent this unconstitutional deterrent effect once
the right to a confidential relationship has been established, occasions
on which the state may compel a newsman to disclose names or informa-
tion obtained in a confidential relationship must be defined with speci-
ficity.
75. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, for example, the Court recognized that the
common law standard for libel actions, requiring truth as a defense to a claim of libel,
would deter the press from publishing matters difficult to establish as true, whether
libelous or not. To prevent self-censorship by the press, the Court required a showing of
actual malice by the plaintiff in libel actions against public officials. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
76. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965); A Quantity of Copies of
Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
77. In Freedman v. Maryland, the statute to which the vice of vagueness attached
was MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A, § 2 (1957), which required films shown in Maryland to be
"duly approved and licensed" by a state board of censors before exhibition. 381 U.S. 51
(1965). It is here argued that a similar defect of vagueness (as well as overbreadth) in-
heres in the statutes which authorize reporters to be subpoenaed before grand juries,
legislative committees, and civil and criminal tribunals, but which do not provide for
nondisclosure of confidential information and the names of confidential informants. For
example, 2 U.S.C. § 190b (1964) provides that a Senate standing committee may require
"by subpoena [sic] or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses . . . to take such testi-
mony ... as it deems advisable." A judicial gloss will later be suggested which will
avoid the vagueness and overbreadth of such subpoena statutes. See p. 339 infra.
78. See pp. 330-32 supra.
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The second general principle that may be used in defining the scope
of the news gatherer's right to protect his confidential relations with
informants is that First Amendment rights, are traditionally "protected
against government curtailment at all points, even where the results of
expression may appear to be in conflict with other social interests which
the government is charged with safeguarding." 79 The rationale for
specially protecting First Amendment rights is that freedom of speech
and of the press are the indispensable preconditions for the exercise of
other freedoms.8 0 The Supreme Court once spoke of these rights as
being "preferred"81 in relation to other legal rights, and although this
language has been abandoned,82 the concept of special safeguards still
survives in a number of First Amendment doctrines.8 3 Correlatively, the
Court has explicitly recognized that these rights are "delicate and
vulnerable"84 and must be vigilantly safeguarded because they are
particularly susceptible to government inhibition. Their exercise is
easily deterred or "chilled" by government action because the economic
self-interest that may be relied upon for the vindication of other legal
rights is lacking in the First Amendment area.85
This principle of broad scope for First Amendment rights is trans-
lated into a presumption that any governmental restriction of First
Amendment rights is impermissible.8 6 The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that only a "compelling,"87 "substantial,"88 "subordinat-
79. T. ENF.RSON, THE SYsrmF OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17 (1970). The Court has held
that these rights must be taken as a "command of the broadest scope that explicit language,
read in the context of a liberty loving society, will allow." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 263 (1941).
80. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967).
81. This doctrine originated in US. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938),
with the cautious assertion that "there may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments" than
when legislation regulates economic activity. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509(1946). The preferred freedoms doctrine has been formulated in terms of First Amendment
rights, however, because freedom of speech and of the press have been viewed as basic for
democratic government. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). The preferred free-
doms language seems to have been primarily a rhetorical device to emphasize the
importance the Supreme Court attaches to First Amendment freedoms. Note, A Uniform
Valuation of the Religion Guarantees, 80 YALE L.J. 77, 81 n.20 (1970).
82. Cf. Justice Frankfurter's criticism of the "preferred freedoms" doctrine in Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-94 (1949) (concurring opinion).
83. The clear and present danger rule (see, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969)), the alternative means test (see, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,
512 (1964)), negative presumptions (see, e.g., Speiser v. Randall 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)),
and the overbreadth doctrine (see, e.g., U.S. v. Robel 389 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1967)) all in-
dicate the survival of a special "preference" for First Amendment rights in modern con-
stitutional theory.
84. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
85. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
86. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968).
87. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
88. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958).
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ing,"89 "paramount,"90 "cogent,"9' or "strong"92 state interest in the
regulation of a subject within the government's constitutional power
to regulate can justify limiting these freedoms. Even the advocacy of
law violation or the use of force may only be proscribed when such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.9 3 It is not possible, how-
ever, to use these adjectival tests to catalogue the situations in which
First Amendment rights must yield to other governmental interests
because in each case, speech and non-speech elements may be combined
in the same course of conduct.9 4 This requirement of an extraordinary
government interest seems to be primarily a rhetorical device used to
emphasize that only in rare circumstances may First Amendment rights
be restricted.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the exercise of
First Amendment rights may not be restricted by indirect inhibitions
or secondary prohibitions. For example, the Court has recognized that
the primary First Amendment right of free association may be impaired
by government investigation of membership lists95 and has therefore
prohibited such investigations even though they did not directly pre-
vent individuals from joining any organization.96 The Court has also
struck down tax statutes which indirectly prohibited the exercise of
First Amendment rights.97 The mere threat of sanctions may deter the
exercise of free speech or free association almost as much as the actual
application of sanctions.9 8 Thus, since the right to a confidential news
gatherer-informant relationship has been found to be within the First
Amendment press freedom, this right should be protected from indirect
restrictions, subject to limitation only because of "compelling state
interests."
D. Nature and Further Justification of the Right
1. The Proposed Rule
In light of the argument thus far, this Note suggests the following
rule as being sufficiently broad and specific to satisfy the First Amend-
89. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
90. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
91. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
92. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US. 398, 408 (1963).
93. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US. 444, 447 (1969).
94. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 376-77 (1968).
95. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
96. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
97. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 US. 233 (1936).
98. NAACP v. Button, 371 US. 415, 433 (1963).
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ment freedom of the press requirements. The proposed rule consists of
the following elements:
a. The right lodges in news gatherers to withhold
b. informants' names and information received from informants
c. except at a criminal trial and in civil trials when the newspaper
is a defendant to a libel action covered by the rule of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan. 9
d. At a criminal trial, the reporter is only required to give informa-
tion, according to the rules of evidence, relevant to the alleged
elements of the crime charged to an informer-defendant and
e. may withhold the names of third party sources and information
received from such sources.
f. Before testifying in the criminal trial context, the reporter may
require the party seeking compulsory testimony to show cause
that the reporter had reason to possess information about the
defendant and the alleged criminal acts.
g. In the civil trial setting, the reporter should only be required to
testify when he or his publication is a defendant in a libel action
under the Times rule and when substantial evidence of defama-
tion
h. and falsehood have been shown by the plaintiff and
i. when the defendant cannot bear the burden of proving lack of
actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth
j. regardless of the source's identity or the content of his commun-
ication, i.e., assuming the source is anonymous and thus unreliable.
In effect, this rule means that newsmen will not be required to give
information at a pieliminary hearing or (except in a very limited case)
civil trial or before a grand jury or legislative committee.100 Testimony
at a criminal trial will be restricted by the rules of evidence to relevant
information concerning the acts and statements of the defendant-in-
former;' 0 ' the requirement to appear at all is qualified by a showing that
it is reasonable to assume that the reporter has knowledge of relevant
facts. 102 In the criminal trial setting, only those informants who fear
that they will be indicted or arrested as a result of information stem-
ming from sources other than the reporter will be uncertain about the
99. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See pp. 360-63 infra.
100. See pp. 348-63 infra.
101. See pp. 346-48 infra.
102. See pp. 363-65 infra.
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likelihood of compelled disclosure. The proposed rule further limits
the material which must be revealed to a sphere of information that
surrounds the alleged criminal act.103 The limited civil trial exception
should, in practice, result in very few (if any) compelled disclosures.10 4
In general, this formulation of the right is justified because it is the
only way in which uncertainty can be reduced, the unlimited power of
compulsory disclosure checked, and vital interests in the administration
of justice still served. Justifications for specific elements of the pro-
posed rule follow.
2. Where the Right Should Lodge and the Primary Discretion Rest
Once it has been determined that a right to a confidential relationship
exists and the power to compel disclosure is to be curbed, a decision
must be made about who should have the greatest role in shaping
the contours of that right-a judge, the reporter, or the informant. 05
In formulating a right to a confidential informer-reporter relationship,
three basic approaches may be taken after analyzing and valuing the
deterrent effects on First Amendment freedoms: (a) the right may be
determined by the importance of the subject about which testimony is
sought, that is, by choosing a point on the spectrum ranging from mis-
demeanor cases to situations involving national security; or (b) the
right may be determined by the degree of relevance the information
sought bears to the subject under investigation or at issue, that is, by
choosing a point on the spectrum ranging from "possibly related" to
"highly relevant"; (c) the right may be determined by the importance of
the stage of the legislative or judicial process at which the information
is to be used, that is, by comparing the function of the preliminary hear-
ing, grand jury deliberations, legislative inquiry, or criminal or civil
trial with the function of the right itself.
The tests thus far developed for reconciling the competing interests
have been based on the first two approaches. 10 6 The difficulty with both
approaches is that they necessarily vest substantial discretion in the
judge and therefore do not meet the requirements of specificity and
predictability which should attach to a definition of the right. Courts
must determine in each case whether disclosure of an informant's con-
fidential information or identity should be required according to a
103. See pp. 364-65 infra.
104. See pp. 360-63 infra.
105. A prosecutor should not possess the discretion in criminal actions for obvious
reasons. See note 108 infra.
106. See pp. 820-25 supra.
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developing standard of "importance" or "relevance." Under the case-
by-case method of developing rules, it will be difficult for potential
informants and reporters to predict whether testimony will be com-
pelled since the decision will turn on the judge's ad hoc assessment in
different fact settings of "importance" or "relevance" in relation to the
free press interest. A "general" deterrent effect is likely to result. This
type of effect stems from the vagueness of the tests and from the uncer-
tainty attending their application. For example, if a reporter's informa-
tion goes to the "heart of the matter" in Situation X, another reporter
and informant who subsequently are in Situation Y wil not know if
"heart of the matter rule X" will be extended to them, and deterrence
will thereby result. Leaving substantial discretion with judges to deline-
ate those "situations" in which rules of "relevance" or "importance" ap-
ply would therefore seem to undermine significantly the effectiveness of
a reporter-informer privilege. (The "specific" deterrent effects which re-
sult from requiring disclosure in Situation X-reporters and informers
in all future situations of the type X will not disseminate information-
are discussed in the next subsection.10 7) Because of the prospect of such
"general" deterrence, the approaches to a constitutional right recently
adopted by state and lower federal courts fail to provide the journalist
and informant with sufficient certainty to safeguard adequately the pub-
lic's First Amendment interest in a free flow of information. 08
The strictest test yet advanced, a requirement that disclosure only be
made when a compelling state interest is shown, 10 9 still leaves the judge
with a substantial amount of discretion and is likely to cause "gen-
eral" deterrent effects of the type described above. It would seem likely
that in many situations the test would not be strictly applied, partic-
107. "General" deterrence is thus differentiated from "specific" deterrence. See pp.
349-55 infra for an extended discussion of both terms.
108. The "reasonable likelihood," "heart of the matter," and "miscarriage of justice"
tests are all based on an ad hoc balancing of interests, and thereby fail to provide the
informant and reporter with any assurance of nondisclosure at the time of the reporter-
informant communication. As a result of this uncertainty, many reporters and informers
will be deterred even though their communications would never have been necessary
to the administration of justice, either because no proceeding related to the subject of
communication took place, or because the reporter's testimony was not required for
a determination of the case.
The Justice Department guidelines, suggesting that the desired information should be
necessary to the investigation, in fact leave the Department free to subpoena a reporter
whenever it determines a need for his testimony, and the guidelines give little indication
of what factors other than "reasonableness" and "sufficiency" must be weighed in mak-
ing this determination. Furthermore, there is an express option to permit, in unusual
situations, the issuance of a subpoena under circumstances not conforming to the guide-
lines. Thus, the reporter and informer can never be assured that the Department will
not seek disclosure of their confidential communications. See Address by Attorney Gen-
eral John N. Mitchell, supra note 27.
109. See pp. 324-26 supra.
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ularly in those situations where the judge is confronted with evidence
from the state that disclosure is relevant to a government investiga-
tion.11 0 And although an "overriding and compelling national inter-
est" or "national security" requirement"' may further limit the num-
ber of subpoenas issued to reporters, precise guidelines will also be dif-
ficult to develop for the administration of this rule. Informers and re-
porters would thus be unable to predict the situations in which dis-
closure would be required. Many groups and individuals that considered
themselves potential targets of "national security" investigations would
probably be deterred from talking with members of the press-espe-
cially informants within the government or of an "extreme" political
stripe." '- Moreover, the "compelling state interest" or "national
security" tests do not limit the range of material which a reporter must
reveal. Not all communications received by the reporter from a "na-
tional security" source would be relevant to protection of that state
interest, but once the source's reports may be disclosed because of his
status, it will be difficult to limit the parts of the communications to be
revealed.
The basic responsibility for defining the dimensions of the right
should not be left to the informant either. In part, this judgment is
based on existing practices. Although specific requests for confidentiality
are often made, the informer ultimately gives the reporter discretion
over what aspects of the communication will be published. In other
words, the informer and the reporter negotiate, and then the informer
assumes a risk that the reporter will not disclose more information than
the informer intended. Although there axe no precise studies of the
workings of the reporter-informer relationship,1 3 informants have
clearly been willing to assume this risk in the past; informants talk and
the reporter is under pressure of his profession's ethics to honor the in-
110. Under an ad hoc balancing test, the judge would balance the importance of
disclosure to a particular investigation against the probable deterrent effect caused by
disclosure in that situation. Under such a balancing approach, it would be difficult for
the deterrence caused by disclosure in a single case to outweigh the importance of dis-
closure once the government has shown some need for the desired information. See State
v. Knops, No. 146 (Wis. Sup. Ct., Feb. 2, 1971).
111. See pp. 324-25 supra.
112. The Ninth Circuit has recognized the importance of maintaining communications
between members of the press and dissenting groups:
The need for an untrammeled press takes on special urgency in times of widespread
protest and dissent. In such times the First Amendment protections exist to main-
tain communications with dissenting groups and to provide the public with a
wide range of information about the nature of protest and heterodoxy.
In re Caldwell, No. 26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970).
113. See note 67 supra.
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formant's request. It is also in the interest of a reporter to honor the
confidence so that his relationships with informants are not impaired
and he can have continued access to confidential information.
The newsman-informer relationship is different from that of other
relationships whose confidentiality is protected by statute, such as the
attorney-client and physician-patient relationships. 114 In the case of other
statutory privileges, the right of nondisclosure is granted to the person
making the communication in order that he will be encouraged by
strong assurances of confidentiality to seek such relationships which
contribute to his personal well-being. The judgment is made that the
interests of society will be served when individuals consult physicians
and lawyers; the public interest is thus advanced by creating a zone of
privacy that the individual can control."15 However, in the case of the
reporter-informer relationship, society's interest is not in the welfare of
the informant per se, but rather in creating conditions in which in-
formation possessed by news sources can reach public attention.
As indicated, the current practices employed by newsmen and in-
formers (absent unrestrained use of the subpoena power) seem to
produce a substantial flow of news. However, regardless of how one
evaluates current practices, it can be argued that vesting the source with
the discretion to invoke the right could only have an adverse impact
on the free flow of information, since one who initially sought
anonymity would be forced to come forward and identify himself in an
effort to prevent the compelled disclosure of information obtained by
the newsman. A prosecutor could thus "flush" out a source by sub-
poenaing the reporter. In fact, sources probably would prefer to have
the newsman function as a shield, protecting them from official scrutiny.
Further, if the informer attempted to restrain the newsman from
voluntarily publishing material gathered, a problem of prior restraint
would arise.11 If the informer could only invoke a right of nondis-
114. For a general discussion of the attorney-client and physician-patient privileges,
see 8 WiGMoRE, supra note 14, at §§ 2290-2329 and §§ 2380-2391.
115. Wigmore asserts that four criteria should be met to enact a statutory privilege of
the attorney-client or physician-patient type:(I) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory main-
tenance of the relation between parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the
litigation.
8 WIGM oRE, supra note 14, at § 2285.
116. Furthermore, proof of confidentiality would often be impossible, as the only
available evidence would be the conflicting views of the informant and reporter. Often,
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closure to prevent a reporter's testimony (either voluntary or compelled)
at judicial and legislative proceedings subsequent to publication, the
situation would develop in which material had been published and
widely circulated and yet was still not available for use in the admin-
istration of justice. This practice would largely frustrate accomplish-
ment of state interests without substantially aiding First Amendment
concerns.
117
Therefore, the right of nondisclosure should lodge in the reporter,
not the source. Similarly, as argued, the primary discretion in deciding
whether the right applies should not rest with the judge. The decision
to give such discretion to the newsman occurs in part because there is no
better alternative. In part, it must rest on an assumption that, generally
speaking, the interests of the newsman are congruent with First Amend-
ment values. tince his professional success depends upon presenting
fresh, important information to the public, the reporter will presum-
ably act in a manner that will contribute to the full flow of information.
Finally, the right of nondisclosure is constructed in a fashion which
protects the newsman when he acts in a professional but not a personal
capacity.118
3. Protecting the Informant and His Communication
The reporter should possess the right to protect from compulsory
disclosure both the identities of his informants and communications
received from them." 9 Disclosure of private communications may make
there is not even an express request for confidentiality by the informer, for he relies on
the reporter's judgment as to what is not intended for publication. See, e.g., Affidavit of
Earl Caldwell, accompanying Petitioner's Brief, Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358
(N.D. Cal. 1970).
117. The informant could not protect his identity regardless of whether he was a
criminal defendant or third party source. Either his name would have already been
publicly disclosed or he would have to come forth in order to claim his right. If he were
a third party, his confidential communications could probably be protected at a criminal
trial by the hearsay rule. However, if he were a defendant, there would be little justifica-
tion for protecting his communications. At both grand jury and legislative investigations,
an informer's right of nondisclosure of confidential communications could be easily
circumvented because of the breadth of the investigation and absence of strict evidentiary
rules. If the reporter wanted to disclose the informer's communication, this information
could always be conveyed by someone else in a manner that did not directly link the
communication to the reporter.
118. Only that information is protected which was gathered in the course of preparing
material for publication. See pp. 365-69 infra.
119. The majority of cases, statutes, and commentary concerning the newsman's claim
of nondisclosure have limited their discussion to the question of protection of the identi-
ties of confidential informants although no justification has been offered for this limita-
tion. Apparently few cases have arisen in which newsmen have resisted disclosure of
confidential communications although it is impossible to determine whether this is be-
cause newsmen have been willing to disclose such information or because disclosure has
not been asked of them. See notes 2, 5, 6, and 15 supra.
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it possible to trace the informer. Furthermore, protection of off-the-
record communications is as important as protection of names in terms
of preserving informer-reporter relationships, for informers may be
deterred from talking with newsmen unless they are assured that their
off-the-record communications will not be disclosed. Empirical evi-
dence'20 and the recent Caldwell case' 21 indicate that off-the-record
communications are a significant part of news gathering, for reporters
often use background information in order to evaluate material for
publication. 22 A confidential informer-reporter relationship can only
be honored, and deterrence minimized, if such confidential background
communications are protected from compulsory disclosure.
When a newsman invokes the right, he need not demonstrate that the
relationship or the material sought was confidential. Again, substantial
discretion must lodge in the newsman in the form of a strong pre-
sumption of confidentiality.u 3 An intent of confidentiality will often be
elusive of proof without revelation of the identity of the informant.
It will also be virtually impossible for the newsman to distinguish be-
tween off-the-record confidential material and on-the-record material for
publication without revealing the material that deserves protection.
Only in situations in which the party desiring disclosure can almost
conclusively show non-confidentiality should disclosure of communica-
tions be required.124
4. Absolute Right at Grand Jury Proceedings and Legislative Hearings
This Note has argued that the primary danger to First Amendment
values posed by unrestrained use of the subpoena power is that
informers and reporters will be deterred from revealing or gathering
information. Unless one can predict with relative certainty when com-
munications must be divulged and when they are privileged, activity
protected by the First Amendment will be restrained. These deterrent
effects are especially likely to occur during legislative investigations and
120. See Affidavits of eighteen reporters submitted with Petitioner's Brief and Amicus
Briefs in Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
121. In re Caldwell, No. 26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970). See pp. 324-26 supra.
122. For example, Walter Cronkite asserts:
In doing my work, I (and those who assist me) depend constantly on information,
ideas, leads and opinions received in confidence. Such material is essential in digging
out newsworthy facts and, equally important, in assessing the importance and an-
alyzing the significance of public events. Without such materials, I would be able
to do little more than broadcast press releases and public statements.
Affidavit of Walter Cronkite accompanying Brief for Columbia Broadcasting System as
Amicus Curiae, Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
123. See pp. 342-43 and note 116 supra.
124. See pp. 367-69 infra.
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at grand jury proceedings, when the government will be tempted to
use the press as an informal investigative arm of the state and to make
fishing expeditions for information. 125 Such effects may also result at
civil trials, where broad discovery is allowed and evidentiary standards
are relaxed.128
Restricting compulsory disclosure to criminal trials and to defendant-
sources meets these salient dangers. To justify this approach to the
problem concerning the informer-reporter relationship, it is necessary,
first, to show that the proposed rule is consistent with the First Amend-
ment values discussed thus far and, second, to demonstrate that these
values, when compared with the interests served by compelled dis-
closure at legislative hearings, grand jury (or preliminary hearing) pro-
ceedings and civil trials, do not require disclosure of sources' names or
informer-reporter communications.
Obviously, a rule that protects the newsman-source relationship at
civil trials, legislative hearings and grand jury proceedings advances the
First Amendment values of limiting deterrence of protected activities
and insuring the free flow of information. (Justification for the limited
civil trial exception with respect to First Amendment values will be
given below.)'27 The rule is both broad and, more important, certain.
An informer need only establish a relationship of trust with a reporter
through a private bargaining process, following practices that currently
exist. 28
Making the confidential communications between a defendant-source
and a reporter open to scrutiny at criminal trial, however, should not
cause substantial deterrent effect on the flow of information. First, the
source cannot have his identity revealed merely by the subpoenaing of a
reporter, since an indictment is obviously prerequisite to trial. Nor can
the reporter be used to uncover the whereabouts of the source. The
reporter cannot thus be used for investigative purposes. Second, the
defendant-source can often predict with some certainty whether or not
he is going to be indicted. He can thus choose not to talk about his own
criminal acts to a reporter if he fears that he will be indicted, arrested
and brought to trial. (The source is not likely to do this in any
event, unless he has enormous trust in the reporter; the more common
occurrence would seem to be for the source to give information about
third parties.) Third, the defendant-source is assured, by the rules of
125. See pp. 354, 358, and note 152 infra.
126. See pp. 358-59 infra.
127. See pp. 360-63 infra.
128. See pp. 342-43 supra.
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evidence, that the reporter's revelations at the trial proceedings will be
circumscribed to information relevant to his own alleged criminal con-
duct. (He need not worry that the party seeking information at trial can
explore his unrelated activities or those of his colleagues.) 29
An exception to the reporter-informer privilege is justified at crimi-
nal trial not simply because the potential deterrent effect is sharply
reduced by the relative certainty provided by the rule, but also because
the source has been linked with some specificity to allegedly criminal
acts. Although the indictment does not function perfectly as a screen,
keeping the innocent from trial,130 nonetheless, at criminal trial there is
probable cause to believe that the source did commit a crime. With
diminished deterrent effects and the subject matter of compelled dis-
closure limited to specifically alleged criminal behavior, there is much
less reason to shield the informer-reporter relationship.
On the other hand, communications from third parties and identities
of third party sources must be protected even during criminal trial.' 3 ' Of
course, the rules of evidence will often make inadmissible, as hearsay,
information about the defendant received by a reporter from a third
party. 32 However, there may be occasions when the hearsay rule does
not apply.1- In these instances, third parties should be protected; the
reporter should not be compelled to disclose identities or information.
Again, the primary reason for protecting third party sources is that
without such protection deterrence of future sources is likely to result.
A third party will not have been indicted and thus his identity is not
known. When talking with a reporter, a third party source will be un-
able to determine whether the indictment of someone else will result in
disclosure of the source's identity. Where the identity of the third party
source is known, the reporter still should not be required to divulge con-
129. See pp.364-65 infra.
130. See A. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YAiE L.J. 1149 (1960).
131. A criminal defendant could subpoena a reporter if he wanted the reporter to
testify about prior defendant-reporter communicatons. However, the reporter's right
of nondisclosure of confidential information obtained from third parties is also applicable
when a criminal defendant seeks information, for the deterrent effects caused by dis-
closure would be similar. Although the Sixth Amendment grants the defendant the
right of compulsory process, that Amendment was adopted to guarantee the defendant
the same right of process as that provided the prosecution by common law. This right
to compulsory process does not override exemptions from disclosure protected by the
Constitution, statutes, and common law. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 14, at 2191.
132. See C. MCCOPMICK, LAAV OF EVIDENCE §§ 223-29 (1954).
133. With no constitutional right of nondisclosure, information received from a third
party informer might be admissible under an exception to the heresay rule. For ex-
ample, a declaration against interest by a third party would be admissible if the declar-
ant were not available at the time of trial. Id. at § 253.
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fidential information;5 4 the deterrent effects may still result, since po-
tential sources may not want any off-the-record communications revealed
for a variety of reasons and compelled disclosure of such information-
even information controlled by the rules of evidence-will contravene
this desire. Moreover, if there is no diminution of deterrent effects re-
garding third party sources at criminal trial, there is also no increase in
the interests of the state, since the third party source is not yet formally
accused of any crime (though he may, obviously, fear such an accusa-
tion).135
While disclosure at a criminal trial limited to communications re-
ceived from an informer-defendant is consistent with First Amendment
values, disclosure of information obtained through confidential in-
former-reporter relationships should not be compelled in other settings.
At grand jury investigations, legislative investigations, and civil trials,
the interests served by compulsory disclosure of confidential sources or
information are not as substantial when compared with the potential
impairment of the public's First Amendment interest in a free flow
of information.
Because of the extremely broad scope of a grand jury investigation,30
there is the danger of a substantial deterrent effect on informants if
reporters are compelled to appear before it. The function of a grand
jury investigation is twofold: to investigate possible areas of criminal
conduct and to serve as a pre-trial safeguard to insure that an individual
is not tried for a crime on the basis of inadequate evidence. 3 7 In order
that it can effectively perform these functions, grand jury investigations
are not limited in scope to specific criminal acts1 8  nor are they confined
to strict evidentiary rules of admissibility.139 Furthermore, they are con-
134. Obviously the party desiring testimony as to a known source's confidential com-
munications will try to get direct testimony from the source. But should that fail, the
reporter must still be protected so that his confidential communications cannot be ad-
mitted under an exception to the hearsay rule.
135. The confidential relationship should not be violated solely for investigative pur-
poses. See p. 354 and note 152 infra. However, if the third party source is indicted in
another proceeding, the reporter should obviously not be able to invoke the right with
regard to this source at that proceeding.
136. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory
Body, 74 HARv. L. REv. 590, 591-92 (1961).
137. See note 11 supra.
138. The grand jury may summon and examine witnesses with no defendant or crime
specifically in mind. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). It can pursue
all ramifications of a particular subject of inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson,
319 U.S. 503, rehearing denied, 820 U.S. 808 (1943). .
139. See Note, Exclusion of Incompetent Evidence From Federal Grand-Jury Pro-
ceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 590, 596 (1963):
Attempts to limit the basis of grand jury decisions to evidence admissible at trial are
complicated by the fact that the issues and direction of the case have not yet been
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ducted in secret in order to protect the effectiveness of the grand jury
process and to insure that information about persons suspected of crime
is not publicly revealed unless there is some cause to believe them
guilty.140
Two types of deterrent effects may result from grand jury subpoenas
to newsmen. First, general effects due to vague rules will occur when
the newsman or informant can neither predict when the identities of
sources will be disclosed nor determine what will, in fact, be revealed
when a reporter who has been subpoenaed actually appears before a
grand jury. The rule most obviously plagued by vagueness is a "com-
pelling need" or "heart of the matter" test used to decide whether the
newsman should appear at all. "Importance" or "relevance" tests must
be decided on the facts of each case, and the informant and the newsman
may often not be able to determine whether the facts of their case will
justify a value judgment of "compelling need" by the judge. The rules
regulating the grand jury itself and the secrecy requirement also make
prediction difficult. Second, specific effects result from a judicial deci-
sion that an inquiry into a particular type of activity creates a com-
pelling need-for example, a ruling that investigation of a violent
criminal act, such as murder, justifies an abrogation of the right to a
confidential relationship. This ruling would deter publication of stories
that occur after murders and depend upon confidential informants,
since the right would not be available to protect the source.
If we are concerned about preventing the general deterrent effects
caused by the breadth and secrecy of the grand jury inquiry, the use
of the subpoena to compel testimony concerning confidential infor-
mant-reporter relationships must be circumscribed, much as an over-
broad statute must be more narrowly drawn so that constitutional
rights are not infringed. As noted,14' courts have recently adopted a
"compelling need" test to so circumscribe the subpoena power. How-
ever, as indicated above,142 use of this test, no matter how narrowly
interpreted, will still result in some general deterrent effects. In spite
of this, it could be argued that, although there will be some deterrent
effects of a general nature, there will also be some clear cases where
fully developed. Because the precise nature of the charges is not defined prior to in-
dictment, questions about the admissibility of evidence at trial which turn on the
content of the accusation cannot be answered before the grand jury acts; questions
concerning evidence whose admissibility depends on a particular situation developing
ot -tial are likewise unanswerable at this pretrial stage.
140. See generally, Note, Defense Access to Grand Jury Testimony: A Right in Search
of a Standard, 1968 Ducu L. J. 556 (1968); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 14, at § 2360.
141. See pp. 324-25 supra.
142. See pp. 341-42 supra.
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compelling need exists, and thus this sort of test must be available for
judges to utilize when necessary despite the potential abuse of such a
test and the uncertainty that will result even from careful use. In order,
first, to rebut that argument-that the compelling need test (or a
compelling need test with some form of alternative means rule) must
be available despite its defects-and, second, to justify an absolute right
of nondisclosure before the grand jury, it is necessary to argue the fol-
lowing point: the specific deterrent effects which result from a judicial
decision that inquiry into a particular kind of activity creates a "com-
pelling need" for a reporter's confidential information are of sufficient
importance, and the benefits to the administration of justice are so
slight, as to make inappropriate the use of a "compelling need" test.
Such an argument can most effectively be made in the context of a
hypothetical case. Let us assume the following facts. 143 On Monday, a
science building at a major state university is bombed, killing one per-
son and causing several million dollars worth of damage. On Wednes-
day, an "underground" paper on campus prints a story headlined, "The
Bombers Tell Why and What Next-Exclusive." The story includes
an account of the reasons for the act and states that future bombings
may occur, but does not identify the informants. On Thursday, the
editor of the paper is called before a county grand jury, presumably
to be asked to identify the persons interviewed and to discuss the nature
of the interviews. The editor either seeks a protective order or, upon
appearing before the grand jury, refuses to answer questions of the
type mentioned. For purposes of discussion, it should be assumed that
the "underground" paper is a part of the "press" within the First
Amendment meaning of that term, that the editor is a "journalist,"
and that the information sought by the grand jury was obtained by the
editor only after a promise of nondisclosure by him.144
It seems clear, on these facts, that if there is ever to be a finding of
"compelling need" for the testimony, this is the case. A violent crime,
resulting in loss of life and substantial property damage, has been com-
mitted; the newsman purports to know the identities of the criminals
and to have information about the crime. Why should the reporter be
able to invoke the right of nondisclosure? For the moment, let us con-
sider this question with regard to the past actions discussed in the hy-
143. This hypothetical is similar to the recent Wisconsin Case, State v. Knops, No.
146 (Wis. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1971).
144. For general treatment of these issues, see pp. 365-69 infra.
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pothetical story, and not with reference to the future acts also men-
tioned.
The fundamental reason for allowing the newsman to invoke the
right is that to require disclosure in this case is to say, in effect: no story,
based on confidential sources, may ever be printed after commission of
the "same type of crime" or a "similar crime." After a ruling re-
quiring disclosure in this particular case, if such a story is printed
after the commission of a similar crime, the newsman and the source
can know with relative certainty that their relationship will not be
protected when the newsman is subpoenaed. In all likelihood, the story
will not then be printed, since the story was predicated on the main-
tenance of confidentiality.
To put the same point in a slightly different way, the result of the
ruling in this case will be to bar effectively the publication of such
stories in the future. The general administration of justice will not be
served in the future since newsmen will not print stories based on
"after the act" interviews with people who call themselves fugitives or
with third parties who seek protection from disclosure. Without the
publication of the story, it is unlikely that the newsman would be
linked with the act and called to testify. 45 At the same time, there will
be a substantial impairment of the flow of information to the public,
information which is of special importance given the seriousness of the
events. Alternatively, the future effect of the ruling will be to exact a
penalty-a criminal contempt citation-from a newsman who is able to
get such a story, and who is willing to publish it while honoring the re-
quest for confidence. Again, the administration of justice will not be
served since nothing will be revealed and the newsman will take a sen-
tence for contempt. This contempt sentence might serve some purpose
if it could force the newsman to reveal names or information, but the
probability that th'e story will either be left unpublished or that the news-
man will choose to suffer the contempt penalty would seem high in such
future cases that follow the first ruling. Since there is a strong likelihood
that such a story will have been based on trust between the reporter and
the source, the newsman will either not print or be willing to absorb a
contempt citation rather than reveal the names.
145. The fact that the newsman had previously written stories about individuals
suspected of the crime would be insufficient reason for subpoenaing a reporter. See pp.
363-64 infra. It is conceivable, although highly unlikely, that police informers would
know that the reporter possessed information concerning the alleged criminal acts. In
any event, if no story were published, it might be difficult for newsmen, particularly
those of the underground press, to prove that they were gathering information for pub-
lication purposes. See pp. 365-67 infra.
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The argument may be advanced that these future effects are uncer-
tain and that the administration of justice must be served in this
particular case. However, since there is a strong likelihood that the
reporter will take the contempt citation,'46 the administration of justice
will not be served in the instant case by a subpoena. And there are very
plausible further grounds for believing that there will be future deter-
rent effects of the kind described in the above paragraphs. First, it
would seem likely that courts facing future cases involving the right of
nondisclosure will construe "the same type of crime" or "similar crime"
to include crimes of violence generally. Thus, a grand jury inquiry
into a broad range of behavior will lead to a finding of "compelling
need" and the demand for testimony; many stories based on confi-
dential informants may thus be "specifically deterred" and not pub-
lished as a result. Second, the general deterrent effect caused by vague
rules may also result, since the probable extension of a "compelling
need" finding in the hypothetical case to subsequent crimes of violence
would leave other areas uncertain. 47
The addition of an "alternative means" inquiry does not cure the
"compelling need" test of its significant deficiencies. The government
may always argue after commission of a violent act that the reporter has
information it cannot get elsewhere; a judge will have difficulty denying
that claim. 148 Moreover, the inevitable vagueness that surrounds the ad-
ministration of so elastic a rule as the alternative means test suggests that
"general" deterrent effects will result. The source and the reporter will
obviously have a difficult time predicting whether their communications
will be shielded by an alternative means test at the time they must decide
whether to begin communication.
The value of an absolute right before grand juries is that deterrent
effects on First Amendment interests will not occur. A corollary benefit
is that an absolute right allows a judge in a controversial case to resist
the political pressures that inevitably build around unsolved violent
crimes. Although the long-range view might require granting the right
146. In the recent Wisconsin decision, the reporter took the contempt citation rather
than disclose the desired information which he had received from confidential infor-
mants. State v. Knops, No. 146 (Wis. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1971).
147. For example, the Wisconsin court found the "administration of criminal justice"
itself to be a sufficiently compelling need. Id.
148. The concurring opinion in the Wisconsin case attempted to narrow the "com-
pelling need" test through application of an alternative means standard. However, an
alternative means standard cannot in fact be applied. For example, federal indictments
had been issued in the Wisconsin case, but the state could seek information from the
reporter in order to deliver further indictments. Furthermore, even if those suspected
of the crime had already been indicted, a grand jury could seek information from the
reporter to determine if others were implicated. Id.
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to the newsman even in the hypothetical case, it could be difficult for
a judge to resist the public outcry against such a violent crime and grant
immunity to a newsman- especially a newsman of the "underground"
press. The existence of an absolute privilege would allow local judges
who believed in the position developed here to rely on a standard
adopted nationally, at a time removed from commission of the act
under investigation. 49
A further argument may be advanced against the adoption of a right
to nondisclosure in this hypothetical case and in all grand jury settings.
One reason for a court to compel a reporter's testimony at trial was that
the defendant-source had been indicted (i.e., there was probable cause
to believe he had committed a crime). In the hypothetical case, it could
be argued that the reporter clearly has "probable cause" to believe the in-
formant has committed a crime because the informant has "confessed" to
him, and that, given one part of the rationale advanced above for the
criminal trial exception, he should be required to testify before the grand
jury.
There are several possible responses to this argument. First, the
person being shielded by the reporter may be a third-party source, an
informant protected--even by the proposed rule-at criminal trial.
Second, a probable cause finding must be delivered by the grand jury;
a reporter, however likely that the crime has been committed, is of
course not able to make a judicially reviewable probable cause finding,
and he should be primarily concerned with publishing information
as effectively as possible. (He can, of course, always give evidence about
his source if he wishes.) Third, the "at criminal trial" exception was
predicated not just on an increased state interest (resulting from the
formal issuance of an indictment) with regard to an informer-defen-
dant, but also on diminished deterrence of First Amendment interests.
The diminution of these deterrent effects was based on the relative
certainty that a source would feel in talking to a reporter, knowing that
this reporter would not have to testify until the source was indicted,
arrested, and brought to trial. In the hypothetical case, there has been
149. In some instances indictment may precede arrest. In such a situation, the state
may seek disclosure of a party's whereabouts through a reporter who has acquired in-
formation from the indicted party for publication purposes. Disclosure may be sought
from the reporter at grand jury proceedings, by means of a special court order, or per-
haps by an attempt to indict the reporter under an "obstruction of justice" statute.
However, the reporter should possess the constitutional right of nondisclosure until the
criminal trial. If disclosure were required in a post-indictment but pre-trial setting,
reporters would probably be unable to obtain information from indicted parties prior
to their arrest, and the public would be deprived of valuable information concerning
criminal conduct.
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no indictment and no arrest. Only when the defendant-source appears
at trial as a result of the state expending investigatory resources should
a reporter's testimony be compelled. Only then can the press function
so as not to impair First Amendment interests by acting as an investiga-
tive arm of the state.'3 0
The reporter in the hypothetical case should also not be required
to testify before the grand jury about future acts based on information
from confidential informants. Again, the basic justification is that it is
more valuable to have information made public and the news gathering
processes unimpaired than to require disclosure or cite newsmen for
contempt and, in effect, bar newsmen in analogous future cases from
disseminating information which they are able to gather through con-
fidential sources.
If the reporter publishes an account of a "general" nature regarding
future events,"" then a general deterrent effect in the future will re-
sult, since it will be very difficult to predict when disclosure will be
compelled after publication of a story in which sources indicate gen-
erally that a crime may occur. Moreover, this finding of compelling
need on the basis of a general dicussion regarding future action legiti-
mizes the quintessential fishing expedition, in which the government
uses the press as an investigative arm. Such use significantly undermines
the autonomy of the press, as the Ninth Circuit has noted.1 2
If the newsman published a report of "specific" nature regarding a
future act, 5 3 a compelling need for subpoenaing the newsman should
not be found. First, specific deterrent effects of the type discussed above
150. See pp. 346-47 supra.
151. A "general" account regarding future events might be: "The X faction of the
militant Y party said Thursday that, in the future, violence could be used to change the
structure of American society." This account is "general" as regards time, place, methods,
and persons involved. It is distinguished from a "specific" account not in any precise
sense, but only for the purposes of argument. In actuality, the line would be difficult
to draw (although there would be clear cases of either "type'). In any event, under the
theory of this Note such line-drawing would not be necessary since the publication of
neither type of account should result in a subpoena.
152. The court of appeals reasoned:
If the Grand Jury may require appellant to make available to it information ob-
tained by him in his capacity as news gatherer, then the Grand Jury and the De-
partment of justice have the power to appropriate appellant's investigative efforts to
their own behalf-to convert him after the fact into an investigative agent of the
Government. The very concept of a free press requires that the news media be ac-
corded a measure of autonomy; that they should be free to pursue their own investi-
gations to their own ends without fear of governmental interference, and that they
should be able to protect their investigative processes.
In re Caldwell, No. 26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970).
153. A "specific" account regarding future events might be: "The X faction of the
militant Y party said Thursday that within five days a major government building in
New Haven would be blown up by party members."
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would result.1 5 4 Second, there would be general deterrent effects re-
sulting from uncertainty about how far the rule in the particular case
would be extended. Third, other preventive measures could be taken
as a result of the story.15 Also, the administration of justice in in-
stances involving both "general" and "specific" reports of future actions
is not likely to be served, in general, since information will dry up, or, in
particular, since a contempt citation is likely to result.
No matter how one varies the facts of this "hard case" (i.e., with re-
gard to the newsman's relation to the informer, the nature of the event,
the place published, or the relation in time of the published account
and the actual occurrence of the event itself), 5 6 the basic arguments ad-
vanced in the paragraphs above apply. Therefore, the surest way to
preserve the public's interest in a free flow of information is to give
reporters a right of nondisclosure concerning informer-reporter com-
munications applicable before all grand jury proceedings.' 57 This right,
thus defined, not only advances First Amendment values, but should
not significantly impair the grand jury's functions. The very reason
that grand jury subpoenas are generally harmful to an independent
press-the breadth of the grand jury investigatory process-minimizes
the loss to the grand jury created by exempting reporters from testifying
as to confidential informer-reporter relationships. With vast resources
154. For example, once a compelling need had been found for forcing disclosure of
identities and information regarding a possible future bombing, stories that were nec-
essarily based on such information would probably cease since neither sources nor re-
porters could be certain of maintaining a confidential relationship.
155. There should be no exception to a reporter's right of nondisclosure when he
has knowledge about future actions, in part because such situations can be adequately
handled through other procedures. For example, if a reporter published an article stat-
ing that he had learned from a confidential source that a building was to be bombed
the following day, several courses of action would be open to law enforcement officials.
First, they could try to convince the reporter to disclose the identity of his informant.
Presumably most newsmen would disclose such information in order to save human
life. However, if the reporter refused to disclose the needed information, the police
might have sufficient independent evidence to indict suspects. If no such evidence ex-
isted, they could begin their own emergency investigative efforts in order to obtain
sufficient information. Furthermore, they would be able to inspect the building in order
to prevent the danger. Had the reporter and informant been deterred by threat of a
disclosure requirement, this information might not have been available to law enforce-
ment officials. Of course, the right of nondisclosure might be abused by individuals and
groups attempting to create fear and panic by publishing false threats, supposedly based
on reliable confidential information. However, this situation is best remedied by govern-
ment investigations establishing the falsity of such reports.
156. See pp.365-69 infra.
157. With this absolute right of nondisclosure concerning confidential informer-re-
porter relationships, the reporter should be required to appear before a grand jury to
testify concerning information not acquired for public dissemination purposes. However,
if all that is required of a reporter is verification of his published works, it would seemth t such verification could be accomplished through affidavit to prevent impairment
of First Amendment interests caused by the reporter's appearance before a secret in-
vestigatory body. This conclusion is consistent with that reached by the Ninth Circuit,
In re Caldwell, No. 26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970).
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at their disposal through the subpoena process and the need only to
establish probable cause for an indictment, there is a substantial like-
lihood that adequate information will be available from other sources
to satisfy the purposes of the grand jury investigation, whether the
purpose be a general investigation or a pre-trial screen.6 8
Furthermore, it is not clear that an explicit right of nondisclosure
will not be more helpful to the investigatory process in the long run
than a diluted privilege. There are a number of situations in which the
exemption of newsmen from compulsory disclosure will aid the ad-
ministration of justice. A New York study indicates that those states
which have granted reporters some statutory exemption from com-
pulsory testimony have experienced no detrimental effect on law en-
forcement but rather have found the privilege to be of aid in securing
information through the press concerning illegal activities. 1 In instances
of govermental corruption, the value of the press as a recipient of such
information is particularly important, for it is possible that the govern-
ment will ignore reports of internal corruption unless disclosure of
such information is made public. 60 Unless sources inside government
are protected, an especially important flow of news will be impaired.
The arguments in favor of recognizing the newsman's privilege at
grand jury investigations apply with even more force when reporters
are subpoenaed before legislative committees. The function of a legis-
lative committee is purely investigatory, and to the extent that the press
is allowed to become an investigatory arm of Congress and state legis-
latures, its freedom and independence are further eroded.
The likelihood of general deterrent effects is substantial if infor-
mants fear that a newsman may be called before a legislative committee
because such committees are not bound by the evidentiary rules
that protect parties and witnesses and check abuses of power in judicial
158. The same reasoning requires that reporters have a right of nondisclosure at
preliminary hearings, for again, probable cause to believe an individual has committed
a crime must be established.
159. NEw YORK LAw 'REVISION COiMISSION, REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES
109-10, 143-46 (1949). Statements from attorneys-general and police chiefs in those states
with a reporter's statutory privilege of nondisclosure are presented asserting that the
existence of the privilege statute has had no detrimental effect on law enforcement and
criminal prosecution, and that, on occasion, law enforcement has been assisted because
of the privilege statute.
160. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the press in preventing
governmental corruption:
Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses
of power by government officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping
officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were elected
to serve.
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
356
Vol. 80: 317, 1970
Reporters and Their Sources
trials.1 1 Wigmore notes that legislative inquiries are sometimes con-
ducted for partisan purposes and personal aggrandizement. Also, a
temptation often exists for such committees to pursue the inquiry be-
yond what is required for enactment of contemplated legislation and to
assume improperly the function of grand juries.162 The informer and
reporter thus cannot determine with any certainty the likelihood of a
forthcoming legislative investigation, nor can they predict the scope of
inquiry if such an investigation does occur. Even with the use of a
limiting test, such as the compelling need rule, specific deterrent effects
will result and news sources will probably dry up.
Although a legislature and its committees have power to investigate
matters and conditions relating to contemplated legislation, 63 the
Supreme Court has recognized that this broad power is subject to cer-
tain limitations. 164 Extending the right of news gatherers to refuse
disclosure of the names of their informants to legislative committees is
supported by the rationale of cases holding that the legislative power to
investigate excludes any powers of law enforcement. 65 The theory of
these cases is that apprehension of crimes are properly the functions of,
respectively, the Executive and the Judiciary. Legislative committee
inquiry has been held unconstitutional when it has been judicially
determined that the committee was primarily concerned with deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of a committee witness. 66
A news gatherer must also have the right before a legislative commit-
tee to refuse disclosure of information obtained from informants in the
course of news gathering. Although there are no reported cases concern-
ing a reporter refusing to disclose confidential communications, 6  it
161. 8 , Ghb o, , supra note 14, at § 2185.
162. Id.
163. See p. 320 and note 12 supra.
164. A legislative committee cannot inquire into "private affairs unrelated to a valid
governmental purpose." McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173 (1927). The power to inves-
tigate does not extend to an area in which the government is forbidden to legislate. Quinn
v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). The power to investigate is subject to limitations
imposed by the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. For example, the Supreme Court
has held that a witness before a Congressional committee may refuse to answver questions
by claiming the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Quinn v. United
States, supra. Legislative investigating committees are also subject to the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957). See generally, Note, The Power of Congress to Investigate and to Compel
Testimony, 70 HARV. L. REv. 671 (1957); S. Doc. No. 99, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); STAFF
or SENATE COM. ON THE JUDICIARY supra note 19, at 57-60.
165. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
166. United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956).
167. On several occasions, reporters have been held in contempt for failure to disclose
the identities of informants to legislative committees. These incidents are discussed in
STAFF OF SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 19, at 60-61, although no rationale
for these decisions is offered.
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will often be possible for a committee to discover identities of sources
if the reporter, though allowed to conceal specific names, is nevertheless
forced to testify concerning the details of his meeting with informants.
Also, the rule that legislative committees can only inquire into fit sub-
jects for legislation is not strictly enforced by the courts,08 and legisla-
tive committees can frequently embark upon broad "fishing expedi-
tions" whose purpose is to discredit the organization or individual
under investigation. 69 The threat of a news gatherer having to testify
at such a far-ranging inquiry has the potential to deter many infor-
mants from communicating with reporters if they fear they are a likely
target for such an investigation.'70
Extension of the right of nondisclosure to legislative committees will
not seriously impair legislative investigations necessary for lawmaking.
Such committees have other resources at their disposal and broad sub-
poena powers enabling them to obtain information necessary for legisla-
tion from a variety of sources other than the press.' Furthermore, in-
formation which the press has obtained through confidential infor-
mants and which is disclosed publicly should provide legislators with a
better understanding of the problems confronting society.
5. The Right at Civil Trial and the Limited Exception
A right of nondisclosure concerning informant relationships must
also be available in civil litigation. The general effect of compulsory
disclosure of confidential sources and information has already been
noted: 72 informants become less willing to communicate with news-
men and the flow of news to the public is restricted. Although the focus
of inquiry at civil trials is narrower than at grand jury or legislative
investigations, there are still reasons to fear substantial general and
specific deterrent effects in civil litigation-effects that do not result
from creating an exception to the right at criminal trials. The broad
discovery provisions of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
enable a party to obtain information that will not be used at trial; the
almost unlimited investigation permitted by Rule 26 has frequently
168. See Note, The Power of Congress to Investigate and to Compel Testimony, supra
note 164, at 671-72.
169. Tests that go to the "importance of the subject" under investigation or "relevancy
of the testimony" sought are subject to abuse in a legislative inquiry, as in grand jury
proceedings, because the breadth of inquiry is not sufficiently focused to eliminate
broad deterrent effects. See pp. 349-55 supra.
170. See pp. 331-32 supra.
171. See p. 320 and note 12 supra.
172. See pp. 331-32 supra.
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led to "malicious, as well as over-extended, questioning.' 73 Since a
party may discover "any matter not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action" and since discovery
extends to "the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of relevant facts,"' 74 the identity of informants may become the
subject of discovery. 175 The impact of this extensive discovery ma-
chinery is magnified by the fact that any person may initiate a civil
suit. In the federal court system, for example, the number of civil cases
filed is over twice the number of criminal cases filed. 7 6 Attempts to
limit the range of the subpoena power in civil trial through use of a
judicial test (e.g., a "heart of the matter" rule) are, once again, likely
to result in both general and specific effects of the type discussed
above.Y77
Although a reporter's right of nondisclosure at a civil trial may ex-
clude relevant testimony and bring about an occasional miscarriage of
justice, the penalties accompanying such a miscarriage are not as sub-
stantial in civil as in criminal litigation. Unlike a criminal action which
involves an attempt by society to impose its collective judgment on an
individual, a civil action involves only private parties. Thus the cost of
defeat does not include the stigma of social condemnation and the
possibility of imprisonment. 76 The judicial system itself recognizes that
imprisonment is a relatively more severe sanction than payment of
monetary damages by requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt for imprisonment. In addition, the Constitution and Supreme
173. 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 26.02[3] (1970), quoting from Comment, The Use
of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1133 n.3 (1951).
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). The great majority of states also have extremely liberal
discovery rules for civil trials. As of January 1, 1963, no fewer than forty-three states
adopted, either by statute, supreme court rules, or case law, part or all of the federal
discovery procedures. Comment, Discovery-the Work Product Protection, 13 KAN. L. Rxv.
125, 129 (1964). For a complete list of state provisions as of January 1, 1963, see id. at 129
n. 33. At least four states have not followed the Federal Rules but have adopted other
extremely broad discovery procedures. Comment, The Work Product Doctrine in the State
Courts, 62 Micr. L. REv. 1199, 1205 (1964). There is a tendency in the few states with
limited discovery procedures to adopt the federal provisions; Ohio, for example, recently
adopted the new revised Federal Rules on discovery. Beirne, Discovery, 39 U. CINN. L.
REv. 497, 499 (1970). See generally Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv, L. REv.
940 (1961).
175. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. King, 45 F.R.D. 521 (W.D. Okla. 1968),
holding that a party must divulge the names of all persons contacted who had knowledge
of relevant facts.
176. Between July 1 and December 31, 1969, 42,361 civil cases and 18,740 criminal cases
were filed in the United States district courts. ADMINISTRAT vE OFFICE OF Tm UNrrED STATES
COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 3
(1970).
177. See pp. 340-42, 349 supra.
178. See A. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 1149, 1150 (1960); H.M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23
LAWi & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 404 (1958).
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Court have recognized a number of other procedural safeguards appli-
cable in criminal, but not civil litigation,""' in order to minimize the
opportunity for wrongful decisions in those situations where a state at-
tempts to incarcerate an individual.
The Supreme Court has already indicated its willingness to deprive
civil litigants of recovery in order to protect First Amendment interests
in a free press. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'80 the Court placed
an extremely difficult burden of proof on the public official plaintiff in
libel actions in order to assure a free flow of information to the public.
And in Time, Inc. v. Hill, an individual plaintiff was denied the
right of recovery for an invasion of privacy that caused injury to his
reputation because of his inability to prove that the error was made with
"knowing or reckless falsity."' L81
The only time that the name of a confidential informant should
possibly be disclosed at a civil trial is in a libel action which falls under
the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan doctrine.182 Here, unlike other
civil trial, criminal process or legislative hearing situations in which the
right applies, the reporter or paper is a party to the suit. When a public
official sues for libel, he must prove that the allegedly defamatory publi-
cation was both false and made with "actual malice."18 3 The require-
ment of actual malice is satisfied if the plaintiff proves that the defama-
tory statement was made with knowing falsity or with a reckless
disregard for the truth.184 Although the Supreme Court has restricted
179. See A. Goldstein, supra note 178, at 1150-51.
180. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
181. 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967).
182. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Since the Times case, the privilege of the media to make
false statements has been extended to include not only government officials, but also to
"public figures," Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and to persons who
are involuntarily newsworthy, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). The Supreme Court
recently granted certiorari to three cases involving the question of whether the Times rule
extends to cases involving the defamation of private individuals as well. Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 904 (1970) (No. 947,
1969 Term; renumbered No. 66, 1970 Term); Roy v. Monitor Patriot Co., 109 N.H. 441,
254 A.2d 832 (1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 904 (1970) (No. 891, 1969 Term; renumbered
No. 62, 1970 Term); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 221 So.2d 459 (Fla Dist. Ct. App.
1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1073 (1970) (No. 1373, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 118, 1970
Term). For a discussion of the manner in which the newsworthiness doctrine may even-
tually extend a protective umbrella against libel suits over all that ultimately appears
in the media, see Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming News-
worthiness Privilege in Libel Cases? 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 371, 381 (1970).
An evaluation of the correctness of the New York Times rule is beyond the scope of this
Note. For purposes of argument, it is assumed that the rule should not be changed or
abolished. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, however, advocate an "uncondi-
tional right to say what one pleases about public affairs." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
supra at 297.
183. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
184. Id.
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libel recoveries in cases of good faith error, it has inveighed against
the use of the "calculated falsehood":
Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the
fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow
that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published . .. should
enjoy a like immunity .... For the use of the known lie as a tool
is at once at odds with the premises of democratic government and
with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political
change is to be effected.8 5
Proof of actual malice is exceedingly difficult under Supreme Court
standards because a plaintiff must prove with "convincing clarity"'1 6 a
newspaper's recklessness or its "high degree of awareness of probable
falsity."''8 7 Such a demonstration is usually made by showing that a
newspaper has deviated substantially from "standards of good investiga-
tion and reporting."'88 Proof of actual malice will often depend on
knowing the identity of the newspaper's informant, since a plaintiff
will have to demonstrate that the informant was unreliable and that
the newspaper violated proper reportorial practices by failing to verify
his story. In one of the few cases where the Supreme Court has affirmed
a finding of actual malice, the plaintiff proved that a magazine had
relied on the affidavit of an informant without checking his character
(he had been placed on probation in connection with bad check
charges) or the circumstances of his story. 89 Had the plaintiff been
unable to obtain the informant's identity (his identity was revealed in
the magazine story), proof of actual malice would have been impossible.
Thus, since a plaintiff has the burden of proof in a libel suit that falls
under the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan rule, if a newspaper which is
a defendant in the suit is given the right to conceal the identity of its
confidential informants and if, as this Note recommends,' 90 a strong pre-
sumption of confidentiality attaches to any transactions between a news
gatherer and informant, recovery will frequently be impossible because
185. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
186. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 876 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
187. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
188. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 888 U.S. 180, 138 (1967).
189. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The informant stated in his
affidavit to the magazine that he had accidentally overheard a telephone conversation in
which a college athletic director gave away football secrets to an opponent. When the
magazine printed a story containing this information, the athletic director sued the maga-
zine for libel. It was revealed at trial that the magazine had not checked the informant's
notes of the conversation, had not checked the value of the information the plaintiff athle-
tic director allegedly gave away, and had not viewed the films of the game that it was
asserted plaintiff's college lost because of the breach of secrecy.
190. See pp. 342-44 and note 116 supra.
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of the plaintiff's failure to prove actual malice. On the other hand, if
disclosure is compelled in every instance where defamatory falsehood
has been demonstrated, substantial deterrent effects could result. A
source who is not entirely certain about the veracity of his information
would be reluctant to reveal it to a reporter, since, if it subsequently
were proven to be false, his identity would necessarily be revealed. Such
an informer might have made a good faith effort to check his informa-
tion, but still not be certain; 191 thus a type of communication which the
First Amendment should protect could be deterred if disclosure is com-
pelled in all Times situations where defamatory falsehood is shown.
The proper resolution of this dilemma in a Times-type libel case' 92
would be the following rule: once enough evidence has been intro-
duced by the plaintiff to establish the probable falsity of the informa-
tion, the trial judge may order disclosure of the informant's name.19 8
However, the defendant may resist disclosure by demonstrating that
regardless of the reliability of the informer-even assuming, for
example, that the informer was a known congenital liar-it made a
good faith effort to check independently the basis and truth of the
information. In other words, the defendant may assume the burden of
proving lack of malice, rather than revealing an informant's name.' 4
The reason for this rule is that, although disclosure must be allowed
or else the Times rule would, in effect, be defeated, it may well be pos-
sible for a newspaper to prove that it had adequately checked the
reliability of a story given by a confidential informant and had good
faith reason to believe the story true independent of the informer's
191. The New York Times case explicitly asserted that erroneous statements made in
good faith are "inevitable in free debate and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive.'" New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
192. This solution will also apply to breach of privacy cases in situations such as that
in Time, Inc. v. Hill, for here also a plaintiff must prove either knowing use of falsity or
a reckless disregard for the truth. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
193. Because great variations are possible in factual circumstances, it is difficult to
define in advance exactly how the discretion of the trial court should be exercised in re-
quiring disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant. Since the issue of falsity
is decided by the jury, it is clear that the judge cannot make an actual finding of falsity
before the jury returns its verdict. Libel trials under the Times rule are not conducted as
"split" trials, with the jury first determining falsity and then actual malice. A judge will
necessarily have to predict the point at which the plaintiff has introduced enough evidence
to prove falsity; he may wish to reserve decision on a motion to compel disclosure of the
identity of an informant until later in the trial. It would appear that a plaintiff could
successfully move for a mistrial if a jury found falsity but was unable to find actual malice
because the identity of an informant was not disclosed.
194. This test resembles the determination which must be made when a civil defendant
moves to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action: all the allegations in
the plaintiff's complaint are assumed to be true and the court decides whether, as a matter
of law, the plaintiff could win the suit.
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reliability. The degree of checking on a story would of course vary with
the circumstances, but it does not seem unreasonable to encourage the
newspaper to follow minimal verification procedures when the story it
prints may be defamatory.
Even with such a rule, there may still be some slight deterrent effect.
There may be a class of sources whose information cannot be checked
and yet whose reliability would justify printing the story. Within such
a class, there may be an informer not quite certain of his information
who may be deterred from revealing a story. However, the paper can
either promise to take a libel judgment or ask him to verify with a
greater degree of certainty the information which is being revealed.
In such a situation, where by hypothesis there is no way for a paper
to check on the information, requiring the informer to have a high
degree of certainty about his allegations seems desirable, if the paper
wants to avoid the risk of either a libel judgment or forced disclosure
of an informant's name.
In a libel case which falls outside the Times rule, the general policy
of not compelling disclosure at civil trial applies. The burden of proof
would be on the defendant newspaper to prove the truth of the printed
story. Thus, it could choose either to reveal the source of its information
(perhaps putting the informant on the stand) or to protect its source
and suffer a possible adverse judgment if it can prove "truth" in no
other way. It should be noted, however, that both in cases which fall
under the Times rule and in those which do not, courts have increas-
ingly interposed stringent qualifications limiting the scope of the action
for libel,195 so this civil trial exception to the general newsman's privi-
lege will be very narrow. Of the modem difficulty in maintaining a
libel action, a recent commentator has written: "No other formula of
the law promises so much and delivers so little."'19 6
III. Administration of the Right
A. Quashing a Subpoena Requiring Appearance at Criminal Trial
Subsequent to the issuance of a subpoena to appear at a criminal
trial, the newsman desiring to protect his confidential relationships may
195. Limitations which make libel recovery difficult include the exclusion of groups
and organizations from access to the suit, the absolute immunity granted to judges, legis-
lators, and executive officials in connection with anything remotely connected with their
official duty, and the privilege of fair comment. T. EMERSON, THE SYsTEM OF FRMmoM OF
ExPRESSION 519 (1970).
196. Green, The Right to Communicate, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 903, 907 (1960).
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move to quash the subpoena. Under current practice, the judge may
"quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or
oppressive.' 97 This determination is based on judicial discretion and
involves a balancing of the materiality and relevancy of the party's
testimony against the burden that would be placed on the party by
requiring him to testify.198 In most situations the subpoena will not be
quashed if there is any reason to believe the party possesses information
that may be related to the cause of action before the court. 19 However,
a stricter standard should be required in order to compel a newsman to
testify at criminal trial.
If reporters could be subpoenaed merely because it appeared that
they might possess relevant information, such use of the subpoena
power would lead to unnecessary questioning by prosecutors who had
no factual reason to believe the reporter possessed information con-
cerning the alleged offense. With the limited criminal trial exception,
prosecutors may wish to call reporters at trial in an attempt to inves-
tigate other activities under the guise of seeking relevant evidence.
Therefore, in order to insure that the subpoena is being used to prose-
cute the particular crime and not to investigate generally, and to protect
the newsman from having to appear unncessarily, a concomitant of the
right to a protected relationship should be the requirement that the
party seeking the newsman's testimony show cause that the reporter has
reason to know about the defendant and his allegedly criminal acts.
Such a showing is difficult to define with precision beyond saying that it
should be more rigorous than the current standard. A newsman's gen-
eral reports about the political party of the accused or the fact that the
reporter at some time had written a story about the accused should not
constitute sufficient reason to believe he has information concerning
the alleged criminal act. Rather, the requisite showing should include
specific evidence, such as the reporter's own writings or testimony of
government informers, that the reporter has information relating to
elements of the alleged crime. Of course, if the requisite showing is
made, the reporter would have to appear at trial and disclose all in-
formation received from the defendant relating to his alleged criminal
behavior, insofar as it is relevant by trial standards.
In the case of an indictment for conspiracy, special caution must be
shown in requiring a reporter to testify. Because of the difficulty in
proving a secret agreeement to conspire, the standard of relevance of
197. FFD. R. Cim. P. 17(c).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Camp, 285 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
199. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 68 Wash.2d 246, 412 P.2d 747 (1966).
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testimony is substantially reduced and other rules of evidence are
relaxed at conspiracy trials.200 Under the proposed rule, a substantial
danger exists that conspiracy indictments may be used as weapons to
require full disclosure of a journalist's communications with alleged
conspirators regardless of whether they further the conspiracy charge.
This wholesale disclosure could result in a widespread deterrent ef-
fect, particularly among radical groups fearful of conspiracy charges.
Conceivably, reporters should be exempted from testifying at con-
spiracy trials altogether.201 The breadth of inquiry creates dangers
to the free news flow similar to those found at grand jury and legis-
lative invesigations, and neither the proposed rule, nor other disclosure
tests addressing themselves to the "importance" of the inquiry or
"relevance" of the testimony sought, are able to curtail such inquiry.20 2
However, if no such exemption at conspiracy trials is granted the news-
man, the judge should exercise care in requiring a reporter to appear
at trial and should not require his testimony unless he believes the
reporter's testimony will clearly further the adjudication of the con-
spiracy charge.
B. Who May Invoke the Right
A key element of the right of nondisclosure is that the person invok-
ing it must be a "reporter" or "newsgatherer." Given the broad
protection and discretion afforded a "reporter," there may be attempts
to avoid compulsory discloscure requirements by those who would pose
as news gatherers. In determining the authenticity of persons who claim
that they deserve to invoke the right, the following rule should be used:
The person invoking the right must have intended to use material,
gathered through a confidential informer relationship, in a process
aimed at disseminating information to the public.
This "process" may eventuate in a newspaper or magazine article,
book, broadcast media presentation, pamphlet, or handbill.20 3 How-
ever, the person claiming the right must have the burden of establishing
200. See Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79 YALE L. J. 872, 877 (1970);
Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HAtv. L. REv. 920, 984, 988
(1959).
201. A precise delineation of the impairment to First Amendment interests caused by
subpoenaing reporters at conspiracy trials or a detailed argument about the extension of
the newsman's right to a conspiracy setting is beyond the scope of this Note. The latter
analysis would rest on the deterrent theories developed here.
202. See pp. 348-58 supra.
203. The First Amendment applies to broadcasting and all forms of publication. See,
e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1945).
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his specific intent to use the material sought by the subpoenaing party
in order to contribute to the public information flow. The general na-
ture of that material will come out at a hearing when the subpoenaing
party seeks information and the individual seeks a protective order as a
newsman. The person claiming the right must introduce evidence
that the information sought was gathered for use in an actual or
planned news story or as background information for such a story.204
This rule, in essence, turns on a factual inquiry, going to the ques-
tion of intent to disseminate, given the breadth of the First Amend-
ment's definition of the press and the presumptions recommended by
this Note regarding the confidentiality of the relationship and the
communications. 205 It will be considerably easier for a professional
journalist to satisfy this showing because of his access to publishing
facilities and the frequency with which he contributes to the public
news flow. However, a reporter for other forms of publication must
be able to invoke the right if he can show that it was "more probable
than not" that the information sought was acquired for dissemination
purposes. Normally, actual dissemination of information related to the
subject of the informer's communication will satisfy this showing. How-
ever, even if no publication has occurred, the reporter must be pro-
tected if he can introduce evidence, such as the testimony of others,
that he was gathering information which was to be disseminated. Of
course, even the actual publication of a story may be an insufficient
showing if other evidence indicates that public dissemination was not
the purpose of a relationship with an informant, but rather a contrivance
to escape compulsory disclosure. Otherwise, anyone anticipating a sub-
poena could write an article relating to information which may be
sought and then claim a right of nondisclosure of sources and back-
ground information.
Various factors that a judge could use in making the requisite factual
determination include: (1) affiliation with an organization engaged in
disseminating information to the public; (2) access to publishing or
broadcasting facilities; (3) previous journalistic experience-past contri-
butions to the public information flow; (4) proof of intent to publicize
the acquired information as evidenced by testimony from others; (5)
204. See pp. 344-45 supra. A reporter's superiors in the publishing process who need
access to confidential sources and materials for editing and verification purposes must
also be protected by this right of nondisclosure.
205. See pp. 343-45 supra.
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livelihood earned through the process of disseminating news to the
public; and (6) fact of public disclosure.
C. Material Covered by the Right
The right of nondisclosure concerning an informer-reporter relation-
ship should be applicable to information and identities of sources ac-
quired in the course of gathering material for public dissemination
through publication or radio and television broadcasting. It should ap-
ply both to oral testimony by the reporter and to notes, files, and other
materials possessing confidential information which may be demanded
by a subpoena duces tecum. As noted, the right should be claimed at
the discretion of the reporter. 20 6 Actual public dissemination cannot be
required before the reporter may assert a nondisclosure right, for, at the
time of the reporter-informant communication, the informant could not
be certain of nondisclosure since he has no assuraftce that his com-
munication will actually be used in a publication. The court may not
require proof of confidentiality because of the difficulties in establishing
the intent of an undisclosed informant. However, the presumption of
confidentiality is rebuttable, and disclosure may be required if the party
requesting it is able to show clearly that confidentiality was not intended
by the informant.207
There are three obvious situations where no confidential informer-
reporter relationship is involved and where a court may therefore re-
quire disclosure by a reporter. Two of these relate to news gathering.
First, no claim of nondisclosure should be permissible before judicial
and legislative bodies concerning materials already published, and the
reporter should be subject to subpoena for the purpose of verifying the
accuracy of his published articles. 208 This verification should include
authentication of published quotations and a representation that the
article in question accurately reflected what the reporter observed and
was told. If the reporter testifies that his article contained inaccuracies,
a highly unlikely event since such testimony would impair his reputa-
tion for reliable reporting, the reporter must then be able to assert a
First Amendment right of nondisclosure. Otherwise, the court could
probe more deeply into the situation, and the effectiveness of any
non-disclosure right would be destroyed.209
206. See p. 344 supra.
207. See p. 345 supra.
208. See note 157 supra.
209. The reporter should be under substantial pressure to account for any errors he
is willing to admit, for unaccountable error would probably damage his reputation for
reliable reporting even more severely than the admission of error.
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Another instance of verification would occur when a news gatherer is
called before a grand jury, civil trial court, or legislative committee to
corroborate information revealed at criminal trial. Here, public dis-
closure has already taken place so there is no confidentiality left to pro-
tect, and it would therefore be quixotic to deny this same information
to another properly constituted tribunal. Of course, under no circum-
stances could the reporter be required to reveal more information than
he had previously disclosed at criminal trial.
The second situation in which no informer-reporter relationship
exists, and thus no right of nondisclosure obtains under the proposed
rule, concerns activities witnessed by the newsman in public. The test
for the non-applicability of the right of confidential informer-reporter
relationships is a determination whether or not the reporter was in a
situation in which he could have been excluded. Thus, a newsman
would have to testify as to his observations of demonstrations on city
streets, but would not be required to disclose information relating to a
meeting of a dissident group which could have excluded him from the
meeting and which admitted him only because he promised to keep the
proceedings off-the-record. 210 This distinction would also apply to all
taped and filmed materials. Films and tapes of private interviews, or
that concern situations in which the informer's permission was required,
should not be subject to disclosure. If films and tapes either have already
been made public, or concern events that occurred in public, they can-
not be protected under a rule protecting confidential informer-reporter
relationships. However, a persuasive constitutional argument could be
made that, even though no confidential informer-reporter relationship
exists, such materials should be exempted from disclosure because of
the impairment to a free news flow caused by compulsory disclosure.211
The third situation in which there is no right of nondisclosure
occurs when information is sought from reporters concerning their
private lives, information which was not acquired for public dis-
semination purposes. For example, if a reporter were being sued for
210. See In re Pappas, No. 14,690 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1971).
211. This Note is limited to an analysis of the constitutional right to confidential
informer-reporter relationships. However, there is a potential deterrent effect caused by
compulsory disclosure of information gathered by reporters at public events. For example,
at violent demonstrations photographic equipment may be destroyed if demonstrators
believe the film will later be used for government investigatory purposes. Furthermore,
demonstrators who might otherwise co-operate with newsmen at later interviews may be
deterred if the reporters have aided the government in the past through production of
such films. Thus, it could be argued that the threat of this deterrence is sufficient to
justify a constitutional right of nondisclosure of all information acquired by reporters
while acting in a news gathering capacity.
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divorce and, at trial, were asked to account for his activities on a certain
evening, he should not be able simply to respond that he was with confi-
dential informants. Rather, he should have to introduce evidence to
establish a reasonable relationship between his activities on that night
and a story on which he was working. If, in fact, he were on a social
engagement, he should not be able to claim a right of nondisclosure.
Although no specific exception is necessary, the reporter would be
unable to use a First Amendment nondisclosure right to conceal his
own criminal conduct. The right is limited to informer-reporter rela-
tionships and does not protect disclosure of a reporter's own activities.
If a newsman is a party to an indictment involving others, such as
conspiracy, the criminal trial exception would prohibit him from claim-
ing a First Amendment right of nondisclosure of information con-
cerning the others also indicted.21 2
D. Waiver
Recognition of the right of a news gatherer to protect the confidential-
ity of his relations with informants raises the question whether this
right may be waived. Since the major reason for recognizing this right is
the deterrent effect of compulsory disclosure on informants, an infor-
mant should be able to waive the newsman's right of nondisclosure if
confidentiality is no longer desired. Such a situation might occur when
a party in a civil trial wishes, at the trial, to corroborate an assertion
made by him by showing that he had previously told the reporter the
same information. Or, in another situation, an informant might want a
reporter to testify before a grand jury or legislative committee as to
their communications.
In order to waive the newsman's right of nondisclosure, the informant
should appear at court or at a hearing brought about by the newsman's
motion to quash the subpoena and testify that confidentiality of his
communications with the reporter is no longer desired. The court would
then determine the voluntariness of the informant's waiver, based on
an evaluation of the "totality of circumstances" surrounding it.213 If
it appears that the waiver was made in voluntary fashion by an infor-
mant who understood the newsman's right of nondisclosure, the
212. See pp. 346-47 supra.
213. Prior to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), "totality of circumstances" was
the standard applied to determine the voluntariness of a confession. Haynes v. Washing-
ton, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). The court, in applying this standard to an informant's waiver,
should consider such factors as physical abuse, threats, and ability of the informant to
understand his waiver.
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reporter must then be required to disclose all information communi-
cated to him -from that informant.
Since the reporter is given the discretion to claim the right of non-
disclosure, he has the right to claim nondisclosure of specific informa-
tion in one action and later disclose the same information in another
action. In every situation, the reporter is given the discretion to balance
the deterrent effect that would probably occur if he were to disclose
confidential information against the interests to be served by disclosure.
It has been suggested that once a reporter claims a right of nondis-
closure concerning certain information, he should not later be able to
disclose that information as a defense to a libel action.214 However, the
fact that he has an interest in the outcome of the libel action does not ap-
pear to be sufficient reason for denying him the right of disclosure in
this action if he chooses to risk a deterrent effect and harm to his
professional stature in order to defend himself properly.215
E. An Evidentiary Problem
For purposes of impeachment, the scope of admissible cross-examina-
tion is considerably broader than the scope of testimony given on
direct examination.2 6 Therefore, a situation might arise in which a news-
man claims a right of nondisclosure to a question asked on cross-exami-
nation to show the newsman's bias. For example, the cross-examiner
might desire disclosure of information concerning the newsman's rela-
tionships with third party informants in an attempt to establish the
newsman's bias. If the newsman were to claim a right of nondisclosure
on cross-examination, the judge could strike the reporter's direct testi-
mony in the exercise of his judicial discretion because the cross-exam-
iner had been denied his right to a full cross-examination. 217 However,
214. N-w Yorm LAw REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 159, at 7.
215. The apparent inconsistency of this position stems from the fact that the reporter,
by refusing to disclose in the first case, is presumably acting in the "public interest" by
assuring a free flow of information, but in disclosing at the libel action, he is acting in a
"self-interested" fashion. The theory for prohibiting disclosure would seem to be that since
the newsman had "frustrated the administration of justice" in the first case (albeit in the
name of the First Amendment), he should have to pay a penalty in the second. However,
whether the administration of justice was frustrated in the first case is uncertain. More
important, the basic theory of this Note is that newsmen, of all shades of opinion, are the
best judges of how to insure a full flow of information to the public. If disclosure is
peritted in the second case, the paper which chooses to so disclose may have its credibility
with sources injured and may not be able to function as effectively as a news gatherer.
However, this should be the paper's decision. Neither the specific nor general deterrent
effects of the kind discussed above would result from disclosure, insofar as they affect the
press at large, since only the particular paper in question would have its news gathering
function impaired.
216. See C. McCoRMIcK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § R2 (1954).
217. Id. at §§ 19 and 24.
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a more common practice would be for the judge to caution the jury to
take into account the inadequate cross-examination in evaluating the
newsman's direct testimony.
IV. Conclusion
The values promoted by the free press clause of the First Amendment
are of paramount importance to the just functioning of democratic
society. These values may only be secured by guaranteeing the news-
man the right to gather, to print and to circulate information-and,
by necessary implication, to shield a confidential relationship with his
source from compulsory disclosure requirements. Recognizing the pri-
mary importance of this relationship, the state legislature of New York,
in May, 1970, enacted a "Freedom of Information Act for Newsmen." 218
This legislation grants newsmen an absolute privilege to withhold any
information (whether obtained in confidence or not) at any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding without fear of a contempt cita-
tion.210 The First Amendment may not mandate so sweeping an inter-
pretation of the informer-newsman relationship. Yet, if the flow of in-
formation to the public is not to be unnecessarily impaired, the
relationship between reporters and their sources must be given more
protection, as a matter of constitutional right, than is currently af-
forded by state and federal courts.
218. New York Civil Rights Law 79-h (1970).
219. Id. The statute, however, does not protect all who disseminate information to the
public. Rather, it specifically defines such terms as "professional journalist" and "news-
paper," in effect limiting a right of confidentiality to those reporters who earn their
livelihood through employment with broadcasting stations and publications which appear
regularly.
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